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I. INTRODUCTION

An expanding global economy and a budding global community are byproducts of the technological revolution of the twentieth century.
Increasingly, lawyers structuring the deal between two parties and, later,
judges or arbitrators unraveling the complexities of the transaction are
confronted with a plethora of rules that may govern the rights and
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H. Bowen School of Law; B.A., 1969, Hanover College; M.A., 1970, J.D. 1982, University of
Kentucky. I would like to thank Professors Joseph M. Perillo, Distinguished Professor of Law,
Fordham University, and Douglas J. Whaley, James W. Shocknessy Professor of Law, Ohio State
University, for their comments on prior drafts of this Article and research assistants Candi Piggee
Hoskins, J.D. 2001; Lea Ann Holder, J.D., 2001; and Melanie Yelder, J.D. 2002, University of
Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen School of Law, for their diligent assistance.
** This Article contains text reprinted or quoted verbatim from materials that will be
included in a forthcoming volume of the Revised Edition of Corbin on Contracts, published by
LexisNexis. All rights reserved.
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obligations ofthe parties. Recent promulgations by theNational Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, such as the Uniform Electronics
Transactions Act, seek to facilitate both domestic and transnational
contracting through the means of electronic communication without
changing the fundamental principles of Contract Law.
Parties from states that are subject to the Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods have the luxury of electing either to opt-out
of the Convention and opt-in' to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) or
to employ the UNIDROIT Principles of Contract Law to govern their
cross-boarders goods transaction. What differences result, if any, based on
such an election ifa party asserts discharge of its obligation of performance
as a defense to an alleged breach of contract action?
This Article, as part of the revision of Corbinon Contracts,addresses
the basic principles of discharge of contract under domestic Contract Law
as reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Uniform
Commercial Code, limited to nonperformance, performance, and tender. As
an added dimension, this Article compares the domestic standards for
discharge-nonperformance, performance, and tender-with those under
the Convention and the UNIDROIT Principles and notes, where relevant,
the principles of the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act.
II. DISCHARGE-THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE
While more narrowly defined under the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts than the Uniform Commercial Code, a "[c]ontract is a promise
or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."2 In
contrast, the Uniform Commercial Code broadens the meaning of
"contract" beyond the agreement3 of the parties to include the "total legal
obligation"4 that results from the impact of the UCC upon the agreement.
This "total legal obligation" encompasses the bargain of the parties in fact
as well as their course of dealings,5 trade usage,6 and course of
performance. 7 In neither case does the term "contract" refer to the
memorandum, the written document memorializing the promises to be

1. See generallyFred H. Miller, IntrastateChoice ofApplicable Law in the UCC, 54 SMU

L. REv. 525 (2001) (exploring the question of whether by agreement on choice of law the parties
may opt-out or opt-in to the UCC in a wholly intrastate transaction).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
3. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (2000).

§

1 (1979).

4. Id. § 1-201(11).
5. Id. § 1-205(1).
6. Id. § 1-205(2).
7. Id. § 2-208(1).
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performed.' A document may be canceled, surrendered, or destroyed, but
it is the obligation of the party that is discharged by such acts-not the
written document.9
When it is asserted that a contract obligation is discharged, the meaning
most commonly intended is that the legal duty of one ofthe parties has been
annulled or extinguished," one or more of the legal relations of the parties
is deemed satisfied without any continuing legal obligation." This is the
meaning to be attributed to the term, discharge, when it is used in this
Article. As a result of some post-formation event, a party who is under a
legal duty by virtue of his assent may assert that the duty has been
"discharged" or extinguished. 2 This response is distinguishable from a
response that such a duty never existed, either because no contract was
made or because the contract, although made, created no such duty.
The discharge of a duty to perform the balance of a contractual
obligation does not, without more, discharge or extinguish all the legal
relations of the contracting parties. 3 A party may be discharged from its

8. Dimario v. Coppola, 10 F. Supp. 2d 213, 219-20 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (distinguishing a
binding contract in the absence of a memorial); AROK Constr. Co. v. Indian Constr. Servs., 848
P.2d 870, 870, 876 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that in the absence of a memorial, policy
favors enforcement if the parties intended to be bound); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §
27 (1979).
9. Revised Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code continues the clarification adopted
by former Article 3 that it is the obligation of the party and not the writing that is discharged.
U.C.C. Revised §§ 3-601 to 3-604 (2001). "A negotiable instrument is in itself merely a piece of
paper bearing a writing, and strictly speaking is incapable of being discharged. The parties are
rather discharged from liability on their contracts on the instrument." U.C.C. § 3-601 cmt. 2
(1989).
10. Stanek v. White, 215 N.W. 784,784 (Minn. 1927); Blackwood v. Brown, 29 Mich. 483,
483-84 (1874).
11. Stanek, 215 N.W. at 784 (maker of note was discharged from his obligation on the note
in bankruptcy; but debt revived by a subsequent promise to pay).
12. See cases cited supra notes 10-11.
13. In United States v. Samco Const. Co., 39 F. Supp. 2d 661 (E.D. Va. 1999), a
subcontractor brought suit under the Miller Act against the general contractor and its surety for
breach of subcontracts. Id. at 664. The court found that the subcontractor materially breached its
subcontracts and held that a material breach discharges the aggrieved party's obligation to
perform, here, to pay the remaining balance owed on the subcontract. Id. In Uncle B's Bakery, Inc.
v. O'Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Iowa 1996), the employer sought a preliminary injunction
to prohibit the employment of a former employee by a competitor and the disclosure of its trade
secrets by the former employee to the competitor. Id. at 1410. The employee asserted as an
affirmative defense the employer's breach of his employment contract by the employer's failure
to honor vaction pay and moving expenses provisions of the agreement. Id. The court held that the
employer's breach did not bear any relationship to the employee's common law fiduciary duty of
an employee not to disclose confidential or secret information. Id. at 1431-32. The breach by the
employer did not discharge the employee's common law fiduciary duty ofnondisclosure. Id. In RW
Power Partnersv. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 899 F. Supp. 1490 (E.D. Va. 1995), the court, in a
declarative judgment action, used the terms "termination" and "cancellation" interchangeably as
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executory contractual duties by an act ofthe other party or by an event and,
yet, the discharged party continues to retain rights and privileges that
accrued or became absolute under the agreement before the discharging
event. These rights might include the privilege to prohibit disclosure of
trade secrets,' 4 the power to seekremedial relief for breach "of the whole

it interpreted a contract that gave purchaser the right to cancel the agreement if the seller of
electrical output failed to perform any of its obligations. See id. at 1494-95. The court held that
absent clear and explicit abrogation of the common law rule by the terms of the agreement and
construing the agreement against the draftsperson, a material breach is required in order to give
the nonbreaching party a right to cancel the contract. Id. at 1503.'In Lloyd v. PendletonLand &
Exploration,Inc., 22 F.3d 623 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating the Texas rule), geological consultants sued
for breach of contract when an oil exploration company refused to compensate them as a result of
an alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 624-25. Vacating the trial court's judgment on other
grounds, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's determination that a breach of an
independent obligation to refrain from unfair competition and improper use of proprietary
information did not discharge company's obligation to pay compensation. Id. at 625-26. In Cities
Serv. Helex, Inc. v. UnitedStates, 543 F.2d 1306 (Ct. Cl. 1976), suppliers of helium asserted the
government's termination of contract violated the terms of the agreement and that the agreement
remained in full force. Id. at 1309. After prevailing on an injunction prohibiting termination, the
suppliers asserted the government's conduct before and including the attempted termination as
material breaches of the contract entitling the suppliers to damages for the full term of the
contract. Id. at 1311-12. The court held, consistent with the Williston view, that an election of
remedies occurred by continuing performance; therefore, no cancellation occurred, and the contract
continued. Id. at 1319. Also, considering the Corbin view of non-election of remedies, the
suppliers' failure to explicitly reserve their rights limited their ability to recover under that theory.
Id. at 1313-17. In EntergyServs., Inc. v. Union Pacific R.R., 35 F. Supp. 2d 746 (D. Neb. 1999),
an electric utility sued a railroad for breach of a coal transportation agreement. Id. at 747. On a
cross-motion for summary judgment, the court interpreted the agreement as providing for
liquidated damages if the railroad failed to make up the tonnage deficit rather than alternative
performances and that if the utility proved the railroad's failure to deliver agreed tonnage
constituted a material breach, the utility would be discharged from performing its remaining duties
under the contract. Id. at 755. In Blue Ribbon Remodeling Co. v. Meistrich, 97 Ohio Misc. 2d 8
(1999), a contract for the construction of concrete piers became void upon the contractor's failure
to complete the work by the agreed date, absent delay resulting from availability of material,
labor, weather conditions or other circumstances beyond the contractor's control. Id. at 10-14. The
contractor sued in quantum meruit for reasonable value of services provided despite its failure to
complete the work as agreed. Id. at 10. Recognizing Ohio's shift in a majority of recent appellate
decisions and a change from the traditional view that quantum meruit was only available when
substantial performance occurs, the court permitted recovery despite partial performance. Id. at
15-16. In Fitz v. Coutinho, 622 A.2d 1220 (N.H. 1993), a buyer under a contract to sever and
remove timber failed to make weekly payments as required under the contract. Id. at 1222. The
landowner asserted the delay in payments constituted a breach discharging its duty of
performance. Id. Prior course of dealing between the parties established the owner's knowledge
and expectation of likely delays until the mill returned a record of the scale of the timber. Id. at
1223. The court held that the breach was not a material one and the owner was not discharged.
14. See generally, e.g., Uncle B's Bakery, 920 F. Supp. at 1405.
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15 or the right to insist on arbitration
contract or any unperformed balance,"
16
dispute.
of any pre-discharge
It is possible for the entire complex group of legal relations to be
discharged at once, when, for example, one party exercises a power to
"terminate" the agreement as expressly reserved in the agreement or the
parties mutually agree to rescind their contract. 7 In other cases, however,
this total discharge from all legal relations seldom happens.'" Consequently,
it is usually necessary to consider separately each aspect of the contractual
relationship to determine the relative rights and obligations of the parties.
In the case of a simple unilateral contract, such as a promissory note for
money lent, only one party is under a duty. Here, a discharge of the
debtor's duty to pay may be described as a discharge of the "contract"
because no other legal relation remains to be satisfied. However, the party

15. U.C.C. § 2-106(4) (2001).
16. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11,
1980, art. 81(1), 98-9 U.S.T. 1980.
17. See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976)
(applying California law and holding that an agreement [of rescission], by its terms, abrogated all
unperformed obligations except those that had accrued prior to the effective date); Metcalfe v.
Comm'r, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1393 (1982) (distinguishing the legal effect between termination and
rescission) (citing 5A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CoRBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1228, 1236 (1964)).
18. U.C.C. § 2-720 (2001); Simeone v. First Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 971 F.2d 103 (8th Cir.
1992). In Simeone, a buyer and a bank had entered into a contract for the purchase and sale of
classic automobiles and parts, collateral held by the bank that was being foreclosed. The contract
provided that the bank's immediate obligation to convey on a specified date was terminated if a
court order was issued enjoining the sale on that date, or the defaulting debtor redeemed the
automobile by tendering an amount greater than the purchase price. Id. at 104-05. Buyer asserted
that the bank breached its obligation to sell when the bank entered an agreement to sell to a third
party in exchange for the debtor's dismissing of its nuisance suit against the bank. Id. at 105. The
court held that the discharge of the bank's obligation to convey on a specified date because of a
Temporary Restratining Order did not terminate its duty to sell at some later reasonable time. Id.
at 107. In ConsumersPower Co. v. NuclearFuelServs., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 201 (W.D.N.Y. 1981),
an electric utility sued a fuel services company for breach of contract to reprocess and supply
nuclear fuels. Id. at 203. The fuel services company asserted frustration of purpose and
commercial impracticability as defenses, and asserted its right to terminate the contract because
of a "revocation" of its license. Id. at 207, 209. The court held that the factual issue of whether
the service company's obligation to supply fuel was distinct from its alleged frustrated
reprocessing obligation and precluded summary judgment. Id. at 211. In ConsumersCoop. Ass'n
of Eau Claire v. Larson, 1995 Wisc. App. Lexis 602, *l1-2 (Ct. App. Wisc. May 16, 1995), a
supplier agreed to supply liquid petroleum gas to mobile home parks owned by the buyer for eight
years. Id. The agreement imposed an obligation on the buyer to "buy out" equipment installed by
the supplier if the agreement was terminated before the end of the eight year term. Id. at *2.
Before the end of the eight year term, natural gas service was available and selected by the
residents. Id. The supplier sued asserting breach of the agreement and seeking specific
performance of the buyout provision. Id. The court held the obligations of both parties were
discharged and the agreement was terminated because of frustration of purpose, triggering the
buyer's obligation under the buyout provision. Id. at * 1.
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so discharged is well advised to request the surrender of the instrument 9
or to have the instrument marked "PAID" to prevent the instrument from
falling into the hands of a holder in due course who will take free of any
discharged obligation of which it did not have notice at the time the
instrument was taken.2°
This Article makes a distinction between a future and conditional duty
and a duty of immediate performance and also between a primary
contractual duty, whether future or immediate, and a secondary duty to
make reparation for breach of contract. Contract actions usually involve a
claim for pecuniary compensation or other reparation for a breach. A
sufficient complaint must allege, and the plaintiff must prove, both the
making of a valid contract and its breach; the plaintiff must show that the
defendant came under a contractual duty, that it became immediately
performable by the fulfillment of all conditions precedent, and that the duty
was not performed. 2' For a number of reasons, the defendant's primary
contractual duty may have been discharged either before, at, or after the
time when it became immediately performable. Because the plaintiff must
ordinarily establish the fact of a breach of duty, it would seem proof must
19. U.C.C. Revised § 3-501(b)(2) (2001).
20. Id. § 3-601.
21. See Michelson v. Digital Fin. Servs., 167 F.3d 715, 729 (lst Cir. 1999) (applying
Massachusetts law). In Michelson, an employee failed to satisfy his burden of proof on his
entitlement to a compensation award after attaining the minimum sales volume in order to survive
a motion for summary judgement on breach of contract claim. Id. The burden requires proof (1)
that the parties reached a valid and binding agreement; (2) that employer breached the terms of
the agreement; and (3) that employee suffered damages from the breach. Id. at 720; see also
United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 891 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing and following 5A ARTHUR
L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1228, 1230 (1964)) (involving a narcotics defendant who
argued on appeal that the government bore the burden of persuasion to establish defendant's
breach of the plea agreement); Bank One v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 16 F. Supp. 2d 698, 707, 713
(N.D. Tex. 1998) (explaining that under Texas law, party asserting breach of contract has the
burden of proof and must establish that a contract existed, the contract created duties, the
defendant breached a material duty, and that damages were sustained); Sonfast Corp. v. York Int'l
Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1088, 1094 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that the plaintiff carries the burden of
proving the breach; then the burden shifts to the defendant who asserted a modification of the
agreement). In Dep't of Transp. v. Scott, 650 P.2d 158, 160 (Or. Ct. App. 1982), a general
contractor asserted that its subcontactor breached their agreement, and the general contractor
introduced evidence of the terms of the contract and the amount of payment made in performance
of its duty under the contract. Id. However, the record did not reflect evidence that an additional
contractual duty, making payments to subcontractor's employees, was performed. Id. The court
stated the rule that a party to a contract who complains that the other party has breached the terms
of a contract must prove performance of the contract on its own part. Id. The court affirmed the
trial court's denial of motion for directed verdict and held that the general contractor failed to
establish its performance, which, if found-to be material by the jury, discharged the other party's
duty to perform. Id. In Nation Oil Co., v. R.C. Davoust Co., 201 N.E.2d 260, 266 (I11.Ct. App.
1964), a buyer of interest in oil leases who counterclaimed for damages was denied recovery
because of the buyer's failure to show performance of its own obligations under the contract. Id.
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also be made to show that nothing occurred to discharge the other's duty
either before or at the time for its immediate performance. However, this
is not the case. The plaintiff does not have the burden of alleging and
proving that a discharge did not occur.' If the defendant relies upon the
existence of some discharging factor occurring either before or after the
duty of immediate performance arose, then the burden of going forward,
alleging and proving its occurrence, and the burden of proof, the risk of
persuading the court of the discharge, are allocated to the defendant guilty
of the breach.'
A. "Discharge," "Termination,"and "Cancellation"-

Distinguishingthe Concepts
Often used interchangeably elsewhere, the terms "discharge,"
"termination," and "cancellation" refer to three distinct occurrences in
contractual relationships under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. 24 When employed in this Article, two of these terms, "termination"
and "cancellation," will denote the event and meaning reflected in the
Uniform Commercial Code.' That is, termination "occurs when either party
22. See, e.g., Labbe v. Premier Bank, 618 So. 2d 45, 46 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (finding
defendant bank failed to carry its burden of proof on the extinguishing of its obligation as an
affirmative defense to depositor's claim of conversion when bank transferred $2000 from
depositor's account); Secrest v. Forest Furniture Co., 141 S.E.2d 292, 293, 294 (N.C. 1965)
(holding that buyer failed to establish frustration of purpose as an excuse for its nonperformance
of a contract to purchase plywood drawer bottoms when a fire destroyed the factory in which buyer
intended to use the drawers); Charles A. Burton, Inc. v. Durkee, 123 N.E.2d 432, 438 (Ohio
1954); Rich v. McMullan, 506 S.W.2d 745,748 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (holding that the property
owners failed to establish defenses of impossibility of performance and fraud in an action for
specific performance of contract to sell their homestead). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 265 (1979).
23. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas, 532 F.2d 957, 968 (5th Cir. 1976)
(applying California law and holding that an agreement of rescission, by its terms, abrogated all
unperformed obligations except those that had accrued prior to the effective termination date);
Blue Line Coal Co. v. Equibank, 769 F. Supp. 891, 897 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (citing 5A ARTHUR
L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1228 (1964)); West Haven v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 639 F.
Supp. 1012 (D. Conn. 1986) (finding the insurer bore the burden of proof that it was released from
its contractual duty to defend insured because the insured chose its own counsel and because it
failed to ask for a defense) (citing I ATHUR L. CORBIN, CORBINON CONTRACTS § 1228 (1952)).
24. See, e.g., Societe Nationale Algerienne Pour La Recherche v. Distrigas Corp., 80 B.R.
606, 608 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (determining whether rejection of an executory contract under
the Bankruptcy Code is a "termination" or "breach" of the contract with varying results on the
obligations of the parties) (citing 5A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1229-1230
(1964)).
25. "'Termination' occurs when either party pursuant to a power created by agreement or
law puts an end to the contract otherwise than for its breach. On 'termination' all obligations
which are still executory on both sides are discharged but any right based on prior breach or
performance survives." U.C.C. § 2-106(3) (2001); see also UCITA § 102(a)(63) (1999).
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pursuant to a power created by agreement or law puts an end to the
contract otherwise than for its breach"2 6 and cancellation "occurs when
either party puts an end to the contract for breach by the other."'27 Although
the term "discharge" is not a defined term in the Uniform Commercial
Code, the comment to Section 2-720 suggests that "discharge" involves a
loss or impairment of unaccrued rights,28 a meaning consistent with that in
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. A "[d]ischarge of a duty
extinguishes the obligor's duty and terminates the obligee's correlative right
and any claim based on that right."29 Generally, the word "discharge" refers
to the legal duty of only one of the parties, for which no legal obligation of
performance remains and the correlative right is negated.
When a defendant is sued for an alleged nonperformance, the defendant
may defend by asserting that the alleged duty has been "discharged" by a
failure of consideration, by a condition subsequent, by the plaintiff's own
breach, or by some other operative event.30 This assertion does not mean

"'Cancellation' occurs when either party puts an end to the contract for breach by the other and
its effect is the same as that of "termination" except that the canceling party also retains any
remedy for breach of the whole contract or any unperformed balance." U.C.C. § 2-106(4) (2001);
see also UCITA § 102(a)(8) (1999); Int'l Therapeutics, Inc., v. McGraw-Edison Co., 721 F.2d
488, 492 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that termination and cancellation are two separate and discrete
methods for ending a contract; the former requires notice, the latter does not).
26. U.C.C. § 2-106(3) (2001); see, e.g., Eck & Assocs., Inc. v. Alusuisse Flexible
Packaging, Inc., 700 N.E.2d 1163, 1169-70 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (finding employment contract of
indefinite duration reserved a right in both parties to terminate for just cause).
27. U.C.C. § 2-106(4) (2001); see alsoMetro. Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 509
A.2d 1346, 1348 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986), affd. by, 535 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1987) (holding that
cancellation is a form of prospective relief); Jazlowiecki v. Nicoletti, 387 A.2d 1081, 1082 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1977) (stating that "cancel" means to declare an instrument void or do away with an
existing agreement).
28. U.C.C. § 2-720 cmt. (2001).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1979) (Introductory Note to Chapter 12); see,
e.g., Freidoco, Ltd. v. Farmers Bank, 529 F. Supp. 822, 824 (D. Del. 1981) (involving a
bankruptcy trustee who commenced action seeking a discharge of debtor's contract because of
commercial impracticability); see also McLain Plumbing & Elec. Serv., Inc. v. United States, 30
Fed. Cl. 70, 78 (1993) (citing 5A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1228 (1964)
(defining discharge)).
30. See Mobil Exploration & Producing N. Am., Inc. v. Graham Royalty Ltd., 910 F.2d 504
(8th Cir. 1990). In Mobil, the non-selling joint owner of an interest in a well brought a suit in
equity against a selling joint owner seeking specific performance and damages resulting from the
selling joint owner's breach of the joint operating agreement. Id. The alleged breach was the
failure to provide notice of its desire to sell under terms of the joint operating agreement that
granted non-selling joint owner a preferential right to purchase the interest. Id. at 505. The selling
owner's successor was unsuccessful in asserting laches and estoppel as defenses to the action. Id.
In Consumers Power Co. v. Nuclear Fuel Serv., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 201 (W.D.N.Y. 1981), an
electric utility sued a fuel services company for breach of contract to reprocess and supply nuclear
fuels. Id. at 204. The fuel services company asserted as defenses and sought summary judgment
for discharge of its obligation on the bases of frustration of purpose, commercial impracticability,
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that the contractual duty of the plaintiff has also been discharged. The
defendant may insist that the plaintiff is still bound to proceed with
performance, may ask for specific enforcement, or may counterclaim for
damages for either a partial or a total breach.3
When, by the express terms of the parties' agreement,32 a party reserves
a power to "terminate" the agreement or the agreement "terminates" upon
the happening of an event,33 it is more likely intended that the exercise of
the power will affect the rights and duties of both parties and that further
performance according to the contract will be no longer required of either
of them. The inference of such an intention should never be drawn from the
mere use of the words themselves.3" A court interpreting the parties'
agreement should never assume that contracting parties knew and
distinguished accurately between the terms "terminate" and "cancel" or that
they used the terms with the intent to express the statutory meanings used
in the Uniform Commercial Code.35 As in all other cases, determining the
parties' intent from the words used must be reached through the process of
interpretation, using all the aids thereto that may exist in the particular
case.3 6 The words must be interpreted and given legal effect in light of all

and exercise of its right to terminate the contract because of a "revocation" of its license. Id. at
204-05, 209.
31. See Mobil, 910 F.2d at 504; Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n, 425 F. Supp.
1093 (D. Colo. 1976); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Page Farms, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 791 (Ark. 1985). In
TXO, a lessor sued lessee for failure to make timely payments under an oil and gas lease. Id. at
792. To justify its failure to pay, lessee asserted breach by lessor in failing to provide notice of a
change in ownership of the leased property. Id. at 793. The court affirmed the trial court's
determination that lessor's breach was a minor one; lessee was not discharged from its duty to pay.
Id. In Inter-PowerofNew York Inc. v. NiagaraMohawk PowerCorp., 686 N.Y.S. 911 (Sup. Ct.
1999), the defendant requested notice of performance of the plaintiff's sale of power. Id. at 912.
Defendant deemed the plaintiffs response insufficient and responded that the agreement was void
by its terms. Id. at 932-33. Plaintiff responded that the defendant's position was an anticipatory
repudiation of the agreement and sued. Id at 933. Defendant presented evidence that the plaintiff
elected to waive the breach and was not ready, willing, and able to perform and therefore was in
breach of the agreement. Id
32. "'Agreement' means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by
implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of
performance as provided in this Act." U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (2000).
33. See, e.g., Bank One v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 16 F. Supp. 2d 698, 703 (N.D. Tex.
1998) (declaring that the sale and leaseback of agreement for equipment automatically terminated
upon an event of insolvency).
34. See Mark V, Inc. v. Mellekas, 845 P.2d 1232, 1236-37 (N.M. 1993) (holding that the
phrase "all obligations are hereby canceled" is ambiguous, requiring interpretation) (following 5A
ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRACTs § 1229 (1964)).
35. See, e.g., Sonfast Corp. v. York Int'l Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1088, 1096-97 (M.D. Pa. 1994)
(holding that a paragraph entitled "CANCELLATION" in a requirements contract gave the buyer
a right to terminate the agreement).
36. See, e.g., Seko Air Freight, Inc. v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 22 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 1994)
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the surrounding circumstances, those extrinsic to the memorandum as well
as those that are to be found within its four corners. 7
The exercise of a power to "cancel" the contract, because of a breach
or other nonperformance by the other party, does not discharge a right to
the agreed price of a performance already rendered by the party exercising
the power or his right to damages for a breach that previously has been
committed. This same principle is applicable upon "termination" of the
contract, when the power exercised was one reserved in the express terms
of the agreement and was not dependent on a breach by the other party.39
For example, a football player's contract with an investment advisor
terminated when the player ceased playing football; however, the player's
right to arbitrate claims for damages resulting from a breach occurring
before the date of termination remained effective." Contracts of agency or

(citing 5A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1229(1964 & 1992 Supp.)). In SekoAir
Freight, the court determined whether $50,000 fee was refundable upon termination of the
agreement by considering the difficulty of determining damages, the risks undertaken by the
defendant, and the plaintiff's rights under the agreement. Id. at 775. In Great W. Sugar Co. v.
White Stokes Co., 736 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1984), the seller sent a letter to the buyer after the
purported formation of an oral contract to purchase beet sugar. Id. at 429. The letter requested the
buyer's signature and contained statements that could be construed as either requiring the
signature as a condition precedent to the formation of an agreement or, as the seller asserted,
making the failure to sign the letter a breach of the agreement empowering the seller to cancel the
agreement with a right to damages. Id. Deposition testimony by the seller's officers failed to
substantiate the seller's belief that it had a right to cancel. Id. at 430 n.4. The court held that
signing and returning the letter was either a condition precedent to contract formation or gave the
buyer a right to terminate the oral agreement without liability. Id. at 432-33.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 214, 216 (1979).
38. U.C.C. § 2-720 (2001).
39. Philadelphia, Wilmington, & Baltimore R.R. v. Howard, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 307 (185 1);
Lennon v. United States Theatre Corp., 920 F.2d 996 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing 5A ARTHUR L.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1229 (1964)); Hayes v. Nashville, 80 F. 641 (6th Cir. 1897);
Cherry Valley Iron Works v. Florence Iron River Co., 64 F. 569 (6th Cir. 1894); United States v.
Cont'l Cas. Co., 210 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); U.S. v. Haynes School Dist. No. 8, 102 F.
Supp. 843 (E.D. Ark. 195 1); Am. Transformer Co. v. U.S., 63 F. Supp. 194 (Cl. Ct. 1945); Singer
Mfg. Co. v. Brewer, 93 S.W. 755 (Ark. 1906); Factory Realty Corp. v. Corbin-Holmes Shoe Co.,
44 N.E.2d 671 (Mass. 1942); Hamilton v. Park & McKay Co., 70 N.W. 436 (Mich. 1897); New
York v. N.Y. Refrig. Const. Co., 40 N.E. 771 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1895); S. Inv. Co. v. Postal
Telegraph-Cable Co., 72 S.E. 361 (N.C. 1911); Sondles v. Johnson, 131 A. 275 (Pa. 1925). In B.L.
Metcalf Gen. Contractory,Inc. v. Earl Erne, Inc., 28 Cal. Rptr. 382 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963), a
subcontract provided that in case of breach by the subcontractor, the principal contractor should
be entitled "to terminate the contract and complete the work himself." Id. at 384. The court held
that a notice of termination as so provided was not operative as a "rescission." Id. at 387. A
provision for arbitration remained in effect, with power in the arbitrator to award damages for the
breach. Id.
40. See generally Blatt v. Farley, 276 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (involving an
arbitration that arose upon termination of the contract). See also Societe Nationale Algerienne
Pour La Recherche v. Distrigas Corp., 80 B.R. 606, 609 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (holding that an
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other employment may provide that one or both of the parties will have the
power to terminate the agency or employment at any time or on specified
conditions.4 When the required notice is given, neither party is under a
duty of further performance; the contract is "terminated."4 ' Yet the rights
ofthe parties with respect to performances rendered or a breach committed
before the notice became
operative depends upon the provisions of the
43
"terminated" contract.
1. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts
Unlike the UCC, the UNIDROIT Principles ofInternational Commercial
Contracts (UNIDROIT Principles) avoid the often confusing distinction
between termination and cancellation by employing the term "termination"
for the right both to bring an end to the parties' agreement for nonperformance or breach" and to end the agreement by mutual assent.4 5
Pursuant to the UNIDROIT Principles, non-performance is any failure by
a party to perform its obligation under the contract. 46 Non-performance
includes defective performance, late performance, early performance,47 a
complete failure to perform,48 non-excused non-performance, and excused
non-performance such as non-performance resulting fromforce majeurethe occurrence of an unexpected external event.49 A party that has not

arbitration clause remained effective after rejection of the executory contract in bankruptcy and
granting relief from the automatic stay for international arbitration of issues of liability and
damages).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 107, 126 (1958).
42. See Hamilton Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 714 N.E.2d 898,,901 (Ohio
1999); see also Buska v. Cent. Life Assurance Co., 145 N.W.2d 721, 724 (Wis. 1966).
43. See Dolan v. Cont'l Airlines, 563 N.W.2d 23 (Mich. 1997) (discussing employee's
rights after employment contract was terminated); see also Blatt, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
44. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts § 3, art. 7.3.1 cmt. I
(1994) [hereinafter UNIDROIT Principles].
45. UNIDROIT Principles, art. 3.2 (1994). Neither consideration nor cause is needed for
the agreement to terminate to be enforceable. Id. art. 3.2 cmts. 1-2. Although no consideration is
required to modify an agreement under UCC § 2-209 (1), consideration is required for an
enforceable agreement of rescission, the mutual abandonment of the existing contract, under
Article 2. See, e.g., Vulcan Materials v. Volpe Constr., 622 F.2d 880 (1980). Consistent with the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the UNIDROIT Principles authorize "avoidance" of a
contractual relationship by one of the parties for some infirmity in the bargaining process such as
mistake, fraud, unjustified or unlawful threat, or gross disparity (unconscionability). UNIDROIT
Principles, arts. 3.8, 3.9, 3.10 (1994).
46. UNIDROIT Principles, art. 7.1.1.
47. Id. art. 6.1.5. Ifobligee has no legitimate interest in refusing the earlier performance or
if obligee accepts the earlier performance without reservation, then the earlier performance is not
treated as non-performance. Id. cmt. 2.
48. Id. art.7.1.1 cmt. 1.
49. Id.
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received performance may be entitled to terminate the contract if the nonperformance is fundamental.
Consistent with domestic law, termination under the UNIDROIT
Principles extinguishes the future obligations of both parties to the
agreement without affecting the terms that relate to the settlement of
disputes or terms such as choice of law or forum selection clauses, which
by their nature are not affected by termination. 1 Termination does not
deprive the aggrieved party of any right to claim damages for nonperformance. 2 Moreover, either party may claim restitution for goods or
services supplied under the agreement before the agreement was
terminated.5 3 Assume A and B enter an agreement for computer hardware,
software licenses, and services including training and software upgrading. 4
The agreement includes a forum selection clause designating A's country
as the forum of choice and a non-disclosure provision for confidential
information provided for the development of the software. After B takes
delivery and commences using the programs, B discovers the software is
defective and insufficient for its needs. Pursuant to Article 7.3.1, B

50. Id. art. 7.3.1. A fundamental nonperformance may be analogized to a material breach.
Article 7.3.1 states:
(1) A party may terminate the contract where the failure of the other party to
perform an obligation under the contract amounts to a fundamental
non-performance.
(2) In determining whether a failure to perform an obligation amounts to a
fundamental non-performance regard shall be had, in particular, to whether
(a) the non-performance substantially deprives the aggrieved party of what it was
entitled to expect under the contract unless the other party did not foresee and
could not reasonably have foreseen such result;
(b) strict compliance with the obligation which has not been. performed is of
essence under the contract;
(c) the non-performance is intentional or reckless;
(d) the non-performance gives the aggrieved party reason to believe that it cannot
rely on the other party's future performance;
(e) the non-performing party will suffer disproportionate loss as a result of the
preparation or performance if the contract is terminated.
(3) In the case of delay the aggrieved party may also terminate the contract if the
other party fails to perform before the time allowed it under Article 7.1.5 has
expired.
Id.
51. Id. art. 7.3.5.
52. Id. art. 7.3.5(2).
53. Id. art. 7.3.6(1).
54. This hypothetical context is based on the illustrations to UNIDROIT Principles art.
7.3.5, cmt 3, ill. 2; art. 7.3.6, cmt 3, ill. 2.
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"terminates" the agreement. B may still claim damages."5 A may not
disclose any confidential information it received to assist in its development
ofthe software 6 and the forum selection clause remains effective. 7 Should
A make a claim for restitution of the hardware, the licenses," and any
manuals or books, A must retum any payments made by B as a condition
to its claim for the goods supplied. However, because the training was of
no value to B, A cannot seek a money allowance for the training provided. 9
2. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)
Under the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (CISG), either party may declare the contract
avoided, if prior to the date of performance a fundamental breach6 ° by the
other is apparent.6 Article 49 empowers the buyer to avoid an agreement
after a fundamental breach,6 2 upon non-delivery after the lapse of an

55. Id. arts. 7.3.5(2), 7.4.1; UCITA § 802(e) (1999) (amended 2001).
56. UNIDROIT Principles, art. 7.3.5(3); see also UCITA §§ 802(2)(B), 616(b)(2) (1999)
(amended 2001).
57. UNIDROIT Principles, art. 7.3.5(3) cmt. 3 (providing an example in iilOstration 2);
UCITA §§ 802(2)(B), 616(b)(5) (1999) (amended 2001).
58. See UCITA § 815(a)(1).
59. UNIDROIT Principles, art. 7.3.6(1) cmt. 2 (providing an example in the illustration).
60. For a discussion of fundamental breach under CISG, see JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM
LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 328 (1999). See
also Andrew Babiak, Defining "FundamentalBreach" under the UnitedNations Convention on
Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, 6 TEM. INT'L & COM. L.J. 113 (1992).
61. CISG, art. 72(1). For a discussion of avoidance, see Anna Kazimierska, The Remedy of
Avoidance under the Vienna Convention on the InternationalSale of Goods, Warsaw 1999, at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisgbiblio/kazimierska.html. See also UCITA § 601(b)(2) (statingthat
an aggrieved party may cancel only upon a material breach).
62. See Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1995). Rotorex,
a New York corporation, was to sell over 10,000 compressors to Delchi, an Italian buyer, for use
in its air conditioners. Id. at 1026. Prior to executing the contract, Rotorex sent a sample
compressor and written performance specifications. Id. The compressors were to be sent in three
installments which were to be completed by May 15, 1988. Id. The first shipment was sent and
paid for with a letter of credit and while the second shipment was en route, Delchi discovered that
the first lot of compressors did not meet specifications. Id. at 1027. After several attempts to cure
the defects Delchi requested new compressors be supplied. Id. Rotorex refused. Id. Delchi
cancelled the contract and was able to obtain compressors from Sanyo, but not before it suffered
a loss in sales. Id. The District court held that the Convention governed and that under art. 49 the
buyer may declare the contract void if the breach was "fundamental." Id.
A breach.., is fundamental if it results in such detriment to the other party as
substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract,
unless the party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same
kind in the same circumstances would not have foreseen such a result.
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extended delivery period granted, after or a declaration that delivery will
not occur within the period fixed under Article 47.63 Seller's comparable
right is delineated in Article 64.' Once the right of avoidance is exercised,
both parties are discharged from their obligations under the agreement.
However, the agreement is neither "void" nor nullified; any damages due
may be recovered and any provision ofthe agreement governing settlement
ofrights upon avoidance remains effective.65 This right of avoidance exists
in installment contracts as well.66 In contrast, "avoidance" under the
UNIDROIT Principles refers to the right to avoid (set aside) or disaffirm
a contract that was a byproduct of mistake, fraud, a threat, or gross
disparity. The appropriate terminology under the UNIDROIT Principles for
bringing an end to an agreement after conduct constituting a fundamental
breach is "termination."67 The effect of "avoidance" under the CISG
parallels the effect of cancellation under the UCC. In ourjurisprudence, the
term "avoidance" is used in contexts consistent with the term's usage under
the UNIDROIT Principles, when a party is empowered to disaffirm an
agreement because of some infirmity in the bargaining process that negates
the validity of mutual assent.
B. Discharge ofDuty by Performance
Full performance consistent with the terms of the agreement discharges
a legal duty.6" This is true of both the primary contractual duty and the

Id. at 1028 (quoting CISG art. 25). Because any reasonable person could see that shipping nonconforming goods to a buyer would result in a buyer not getting what he expected, the breach was
fundamental. See id.; see also Med. Mktg. Int'l, Inc. v. Internazionale Medico Scientifica, S.R.I.,
1999 WL 311945, * I (E.D. La.). This case involved a dispute between a Louisiana corporation
and an Italian corporation that manufactures radiology equipment. Id. The parties entered into an
agreement granting the seller an exclusive right to sell Giotto Mammography units to the buyer.
Id. The FDA seized the equipment for non-compliance with administrative procedures, and a
dispute arose between the parties as to who bore the responsibility of bringing the equipment into
compliance with governmental safety regulations. Id. Buyer demanded mediation. Id. After
mediation failed, the parties entered into arbitration. Id. Buyer was awarded damages. Id. Buyer
sought confirmation of the award. Id.
63. CISG, art. 47.
64. Id. art. 64.
65. Id. art. 8 1(1); see also Kazimierska, supra note 61.
66. CISG, art. 73.
67. UNIDROIT Principles, art. 7.3.1.
68. Allman v. Allman, 2000 WL 1728339, *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (citing 5A ARTHUR L.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1230 (1964)) (holding husband's obligation to pay balance of
former wife's car loan was discharged by the wife's insurance company when the car was totally
destroyed by wife); Rodgers v. Erickson Air-Crane Co., 2000 WL 1211157, *7 (Del. Super. Ct.
2000) (citing 5A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1230 (1952)) (rejecting seller's
argument that its relationship with the buyer was governed by a writing submitted and signed after
full performance by both parties because both duties were discharged).
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secondary duty to compensate or to make restitution after a breach of the
contract. Full and exact performance means not only performance of the
character, quality, and amount as required but also performance within the
agreed time. Whether the performance rendered is in accord with that
required by the contract is to be determined by interpretation of the terms
and by evidence of competent witnesses. In some cases, interpretation may
be difficult, or the evidence may be conflicting."
Correlatively, substantial performance is not full performance and does
not discharge a legal duty.7" A defect, no matter how slight, prevents the
discharge of the duty.7 However, under the principle of de minimis non
curat lex, 2 courts occasionally find that something less than full
performance satisfies the primary contractual duty and permit a discharge
despite trifling defects. 3 Applying the principle ofde minimis non Curatlex
while attempting to adhere to the rule of full performance, a court may find
that the contract permitted such deviations or that the "variance was within
the range allowed by the specifications."'74
Substantial performance gives the performing party a claim for the
contract price and the other party a claim only for damages.75 Insubstantial
performance, performance resulting in a material breach ofthe agreement,
may result in a claim for restitution by the breaching party but not one for
damages.76
1. Performance of the Secondary Duty
Consider that a buyer and a seller agree that the seller will deliver 1000
pounds of frozen chicken breast in July. The buyer agrees to pay $.50 per
pound. Thereafter, the seller repudiates, refusing to deliver. The seller's
primary duty to deliver the goods has been breached. Upon breach of the
contract, the law gives the injured party, the buyer, a right or claim for
damages and imposes upon the breaching party, the seller, a duty to pay
damages.77 This duty to pay damages is distinguishable from the primary
69. See Sands Motel v. Hargrave, 358 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (finding a
plumbing contractor's duty to perform installation of hot and cold water lines in a workmanlike
manner was limited or restricted by the plans agreed to by the parties; plumber's obligation of
performance was discharged by performance consistent with the plans in workmanlike manner).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235 cmt. a, cmt. d (1979).
71. Id. § 237 cmt. d.
72. "The law does not concern itself with trifles." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 443 (7th ed.

1999).
73.
74.
Vechten,
75.
76.
77.

E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 8.8 (3d ed. 1999).
Id.(citing Intermeat v. Am. Poultry, 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1978); Van Cliefv. Van
29 N.E. 1017 (N.Y. 1892)).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrs § 237 cmt. d (1979).
Id.
5 ARTHURL. CoRBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 995 (1964).
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duty of performance, delivering the chicken breast, which the breaching
party failed to render as required by the agreement.7" The secondary duty,
the obligation to compensate the buyer for the breach,79 must now be
performed.
The performance required by the secondary duty to compensate for a
breach of contract is usually the payment of a definite sum of money in
settlement of a claim that previously may have been unliquidated.8 0 As long
as the claim is unliquidated, determining the performance required by this
duty must be resolved. Unless the agreement provides an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism, the amount of damages to be paid must be resolved
through litigation."1 Once the required performance is determined, the claim
is liquidated and the secondary duty of performance-paying the sum that
is now liquidated-will only be discharged by paying the amount required,
the exact performance imposed in the judgment entered.82
Assume, however, that the buyer breached the agreement after the seller
delivered and the buyer accepted the goods. Seller then brings an action for
the price.83 Success here by the seller imposes on the buyer the obligation
to specifically perform the promise to pay a liquidated sum, the agreed cost
of the seller's performance. 84 Under UCC § 2-709, the seller is demanding
that the buyer pay the agreed price and any incidental damages that might
have been incurred as a result of the buyer's breach. The price of the
goods is a liquidated sum, $500, a sum fixed by the agreement. Here, the
primary duty, performance consistent with the terms of the contract, is the
major element ofthe buyer's secondary obligation to compensate the seller
for breach, which now includes the liquidated sum of the price and
incidental costs incurred by seller. With the addition ofincidental damages,
if any, the buyer's secondary duty is established. 6

78. Id. at §§ 995, 1001; 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTONON CONTRACTS §§ 1338-1339A
(3d ed. 1936); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 277 (1932).
79. 5 CORBIN supra note 77, § 995.
80. Id.
81. 5A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1230 (1964).
82. A judgment entered in a breach of contract action has been called "higher evidence of
that contract, because it [the contract] now has the sanction of the judicial determination of its
validity and amount by a court of law." Blount v. Windley, 95 U.S. 173, 176 (1877). Upon entry
of a judgment the "original contract or cause of action becomes merged, and the judgment
constitutes a new and liquidated debt. This debt and liability for interest ... are obligations
binding upon the debtor till the judgment is reversed or satisfied." Butler v. Rockwell, 29 P. 458,
461 (Colo. 1892).

83. U.C.C. § 2-709 (2001).
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Bulk Oil v. Sun Oil Trading Co., 697 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that
interest is an incidental expense).
86. U.C.C. § 2-710.
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As the hypothetical situation illustrates, a primary contractual duty to
render a promised performance may continue even after a breach by the
promisor. The obligation to pay a liquidated money debt 7 and an order of
specific performance" are examples of the continuation of the primary
contractual duty.
Generally, if the primary contractual duty of performance is the payment
of money, this duty can be rendered by the debtor after the due date as well
as at the agreed time. 9 Payment of the amount of the debt discharges the
debt9 when made even if made after the due date. The duty to compensate
for the breach is an additional secondary duty.9 A late payment of the
liquidated sum does not discharge the secondary duty to compensate for the
delay in making the payment.92 Additionally, payment is a performance that
does not require cooperation by the creditor or someone representing him
to discharge the obligation, but receipt ofthe payment by the creditor or his
representative does.93 This is true whether payment is made on the exact
day of maturity or thereafter.94 But the creditor's cooperative action is no
more than the actual receipt of the money.95
A secondary duty to pay unliquidated damages for breach is not
discharged by making the payment that is received by the creditor. The
creditor must assent to receiving the payment as a liquidation and discharge
of the secondary duty as well. Only upon assent to the offer that the
payment discharge both duties does the receipt of the payment discharge
97
both duties. 96 There is no "satisfaction" in the absence of an "accord.,
2. Pleading and Proof of the Cause of Action for Breach
In an action for damages or other types of reparation for a breach of
contract, the plaintiff must allege and prove the making ofthe contract and

87. The common law action of debt gave specific enforcement of the duty to pay with
BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON
LAW PLEADING § 52 (3d ed. 1923). Action of debt employed "where the consideration has been
executed and where there is an absolute duty to pay in money the value of the performance
rendered, there debt on simple contract or indebitatus assumpsit is a proper remedy." Id.

damages awarded for the delay in the payment.

88. CORBIN, supra note 77, § 990.
89. U.C.C. Revised § 3-603(c) (2001).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 cmt. c (1979).
91. See U.C.C. § 3-603.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See David McDavid Nissan, Inc. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 10 S.W.3d 56, 71 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1999); Stevens v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 929 S.W.2d 665, 673 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996);
Simburg, Ketter, Sheppard & Prudy, LLP v. Olshan, 988 P.2d 467, 472 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
97. DavidMcDavid Nissan, 10 S.W.3d at 71.

90. Id. § 3-603;
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the fact of the breach. In the case of a unilateral money debt, payment is an
affirmative defense.98 The burden of proof or, in the terms of the Uniform
Commercial Code, the burden of establishing99 the fact of breach is
allocated to the plaintiff, who has alleged that full and exact performance
of the legal duty owed was not in fact performed.0 0 If a plaintiff seeks
damages for a breach he must allege and prove the action or inaction by the
defendant that constitutes a breach of their agreement.' 0 ' In defending an
action for breach of contract, a defendant may assert that a discharge
subsequent to the breach occurred.'0 2 A discharge that takes place
subsequent to breach must be alleged and proved by the defendant.0 3
Payment or any other performance that is accepted, subsequent to breach,
as satisfaction must be shown by the defendant.0 4 Although accord and
satisfaction must be pled and is distinguishable from payment or

98. See Geo. Byers Sons, Inc. v. Norman Smith, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3648, * 10 (1999)
(finding defendant's failure to plea payment resulted in a waiver of the affirmative defense;
consequently, trial court properly denied defendant the opportunity to rebut or refute plaintiff's
evidence of nonpayment and properly limited the scope of defendant's cross-examination);
Blackwell v. Int'l Union, 487 N.E.2d 334,337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the union failed
to plead or prove the affirmative defense of partial payment); Wagner v. Savage, 244 P.2d 161,
166 (Or. 1952) (declaring that payment is a defense which must be plead and proved; the
defendant has the burden of proof); Baehr v. Buell, 113 N.W. 433, 434 (Wis. 1907). But see
Pollak v. Winter, 51 So. 998, 999 (Ala. 1910) (stating that the plaintiff in a suit on an open
account must show the rendering of service, the value of the service and that payment was not
made when due). If the defendant relies on payment to an agent, he must prove the authority of
the agent to receive it for the principal. Bacot v. S. C. Loan & Trust Co., 127 S.E. 562, 569 (S.C.
1925).
99. U.C.C. § 1-201(8) (2000).
100. See NICOR Exploration Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 50 F.3d 1341, 1349
(5th Cir. 1995) (citing 5A CORBIN, supra note 81, § 1230); Nankin v. Beverly EnterprisesWisconsin, 774 F. Supp. 540, 543 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (citing 5A CORBIN, supranote 81, § 1230);
Ticknor v. Micro Ink Sys. Corp., 1994 WL 879505, *3 (Mass. Super. 1994) (citing 5A CORBIN,
supra note 81, § 1230).
101. Lent v. New York & Mass. Ry., 29 N.E. 988,990 (N.Y. 1892) (holding that the plaintiff
must aver breach by non-payment); Sec. Fin. Co. v. Linker, 176 A. 76, 77 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1935)
(finding that in a suit against a guarantor, the plaintiff must allege and prove nonpayment by the
principal debtor; in the absence of such proof, the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict in his
favor).
102. See Sec. Fin. Co., 176 A. at 78.
103. See id.
104. In Benson v. Lamb, 101 N.E.2d 235 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951), the plaintiff commenced an
action against the administrator of decedent's estate alleging work for the decedent, the nature of
the work, and the reasonable value of the services provided. Id. at 236. The administrator
answered specifically denying the statement of account and alleged that plaintiff had received
payment. Id. Plaintiff did not reply. Id. On the date set for trial, the administrator filed a motion
for judgment on the pleadings. Id. at 236-37. The trial court sustained the motion and entered
judgment in favor of the administrator. Id. at 237. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. Id. at
238.
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performance of the obligation owed, a defendant's plea of "payment" as a
defense has been held sufficient where the proof established the liquidation
of a sum owed and the cancellation ofmutual debts resulting in payment.'0 5
Such a settlement, however, is not exact "performance." Rather, the
settlement is a discharge by accord and satisfaction or new agreement, and
the burden of establishing the discharge is on the defendant. 6
C. Application ofPayments When More than One Debt Exists
An obligor who owes two or more duties to the same obligee has the
power to direct application of any payment tendered, unless the obligor
holds the money as a trustee or under a duty to apply it in a particular
fashion and the obligee knows or has reason to know of the duty.'0 7 Absent

105. A plea of "payment" of a note is supported by proof that the plaintiff had owed an
unliquidated amount for services rendered by the defendant, that by agreement they had liquidated
this as the amount still due on the note, and that the two amounts were then set off against each
other and discharged. Marr v. Heggie, 58 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Mass. 1944).

106. Id.
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 258 (1979).
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), as between two or more contractual duties
owed by an obligor to the same obligee, a performance is applied according to a
direction made by the obligor to the obligee at or before the time of performance.
(2) If the obligor is under a duty to a third person to devote a performance to the
discharge of a particular duty that the obligor owes to the obligee and the obligee
knows or has reason to know this, the obligor's performance is applied to that
duty.
Id. Although noting that questions relating to performances other than the payment of money are
rare under this section, the scope of the Restatement provision is not limited to the payment of
money. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Application of Performance, Introductory Note,
at 297.
It has been held that mere knowledge by the creditor of the source from which the debtor
derived the funds received but without direction as to the application of the funds will not deprive
the creditor of power to apply the funds to any of the claims against the debtor. F.H. McGraw &
Co. v. Milcor Steel Co., 149 F.2d 301, 302 (2d Cir. 1945). This Article takes the position that
knowledge of, or reason to know from the circumstances the source of the funds limits the
creditor's ability to allocate the performance to debts other than those associated with that source.
See Lyman Lumber, Inc. v. Thompson, 405 N.W.2d 708,709-10 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987); Carroll v.
Beck, 151 F.2d 964 (6th Cir. 1945) (requiring the creditor to apply the payment in accordance
with the interests of the general contractor from whom the debtor derived the money). See
generally Moser Paper Co. v. N. Shore Publ'g Co., 266 N.W.2d 411,415 (Wis. 1978) (discussing
the "identical property" exception reflected in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 258 (2)). Such
a rule prevents collusion between the obligor and obligee and avoids the potential double recovery
from one who has performed its obligation in good faith. Note, Recent Decisions,32 VA. L. REV.
162, 167-68 (1945) (criticizing F.H. McGraw & Co., 149 F.2d 301).
In F.H. McGraw & Co., a general contractor brought an interpleader action against its
subcontractor and the subcontractor's suppliers. F.H.McGraw & Co., 149 F.2d at 302. These
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a duty owed to a third person or obligee's knowledge or reason to know
of the source of the performance, an obligor may tender a payment on its
own terms and the obligee must receive it on those terms or not at all. If the
obligor owes more than one debt to the obligee, matured or unmatured,
then directions given at or before the time ofpayment but not later than the
obligee' s application or a change in the circumstances, such as a subsequent
dispute or controversy between the parties, must be followed by the
obligee. "8 The obligor may instruct that the payment be applied to any one
of the debts, to none of them, or to more than one of them in any specified
proportion. To attain his desired goal, the obligor must manifest his

defendants brought a third party claim against the general contractor's surety. Id. at 303. The
surety asserted improper allocation of payments as a defense. Id. With the consent of the
subcontractor and knowledge of the source of the funds received, the suppliers reallocated all
payments previously received from the subcontractor on the job subject to the surety's bond to a
subsequent job that had not been performed and was unmatured at the time of the previous
payments. Id. at 303-05. Troublesome here is the court's upholding of a reallocation and revival
of a debt previously discharged at a time subsequent to the payment by the obligor. Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 258 cmt. b, provides that the direction given by the obligor at the time of
performance controls rather than some prior direction. Thus, the direction given at the time of
performance rather than a subsequent direction should have priority, especially if the interests of
third parties are affected. See id.
In contrast to F.H.McGraw & Co., the Alaska Supreme Court in State ex rel. PalmerSupply
Co. v. Walsh & Co., 575 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1978), held that the creditor's method of allocation
was ineffective despite its agreement with the obligor. In an action under Alaska's Little Miller
Act, the supplier and subcontractor agreed to apply the funds received from the general contractor
to other debts owed. Id. at 1217. The supplier knew the source of the funds; the check received
from the general contractor indicated thejob for which payment was being made. Id.The obligee's
knowledge of the obligor's duty to a third person to devote a performance to discharge a particular
obligation limited the obligee's right to apply the payment contrary to that duty despite an
agreement with the debtor. Id. at 1218. Here the duty under the Little Miller Act and the common
law duty of performance owed a surety in the former case provided the bases for disregarding the
agreement between the debtor and the obligee. Id.; see also Bounds v. Nuttle, 30 A.2d 263 (Md.
1943) (holding that absent an agreement between contractor and materialmen to apply funds
received from owner to other debts of the contractor so as to extract a double payment from owner
through the imposition of mechanics' liens, contractor may direct the application of payments
received from owner as desired); C.D. Johnson Lumber Corp. v. Leonard, 236 P.2d 926, 933 (Or.
195 1) (finding application by the creditor to general open account is final if the debtor acquiesces
therein); Gourley v. Iverson Tool Co., 186 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945); Utah State Bldg.
Comm. v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 140 P.2d 763 (Utah 1943) (recognizing a split of authority on
the question of the ability of the materialmen to apply the funds received when it knows of the
source but the funds are given without designation).
108. See Gayer v. Gayer, 952 P.2d 1030 (Or. 1998) (reversing trial court ruling that father's
direction on application was effective from the date he increased his monthly support payments
rather than the date of the letter from father's new wife with a statement of intention) (citing 5A
CORBIN, supra note 81, § 1231).
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intention' °9 to the obligee through his written or spoken words or through
the circumstances including the payment itself."' 0
In the absence of direction, the obligee may apply the payment, within
certain limitations, to his own advantage if the obligee manifests its
intentions-gives notification-to the obligor within a reasonable time after
the application."' The obligee may apply the payment to any matured
lawful obligation." Unless the obligee has reason to know that the obligor

109. In Shahmoon Indus., Inc. v. PeerlessIns. Co., 226 N.Y.S.2d 997 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962),
it was a disputed question of fact whether a debtor on two separate accounts directed the
application of his payments to one account or the other. Id. This determination depended on the
amount of the liability of the defendant as a surety on one of the accounts. Id.
In Williams v. Milliger, 352 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Ct. App. 1962), the defendant owed plaintiff
$1,288.60 for services; in a bankruptcy proceeding the plaintiff received $257.72. Id. at 794. The
balance of $1,030.88 was barred. Id. at 795. Thereafter, the plaintiff rendered additional services
valued at $563. Id. The plaintiff received a payment of $485, the trial court found that this was
paid and received on account of the barred debt. Id.The plaintiff was held to be entitled to the full
$563. Id. at 796.
In Schreiber v. Armstrong, 374 P.2d 297 (N.M. 1962), the plaintiff and defendant were the
sole shareholders in a corporation to which the defendant owed $1000. Id. at 298. In order to raise
more capital, the plaintiff and defendent mutually agreed that each would buy ten more shares,
for which each would pay $1000. l The defendant handed $1000 to the plaintiff, directing him
to pay it to the corporation for the additional ten shares. Id. Instead, the plaintiff caused the
corporation to credit the defendant's account in payment of his debt. Id.This action by the plaintiff
was a breach of contract for which the defendant had a claim for damages. Id. Whether the
defendant owed two obligations to the corporation, or no obligation, the defendant had power to
direct the use of his money to the purchase of stock. Id. at 300-01.
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 258, cmt. b & ill. 6 (1979); see also Del.
Dredging Co. v. Tucker Stevedoring Co., 25 F.2d 44, 45-46 (3d. Cir. 1928); Jacobson v. United
Nat'l Bank, 5 B.R. 274, 278 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1980); Pearce v. Walker, 15 So. 568, 568 (Ala.
1894); Merker v. Lake Region Packing Ass'n, 174 So. 229, 230 (Fla. 1937); Henry v. Halifax
Hosp. Dist., 368 So.2d 432, 432 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1979); Carozza v. Brannan, 46 A.2d 198,
199-200 (Md. 1946); Standard Salt & Cement Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 213 N.W. 543,
544 (Minn. 1927); Cent. Nat'l Bank v. Paton, 439 N.Y.S.2d 619, 621 (N.Y. 1981); Gayer v.
Gayer, 952 P.2d 1030, 1030-34 (Or. 1998); F.M. Slagle & Co. v. Bushnell, 16 N.W.2d 914, 91921 (S.D. 1945).
111. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTs § 259(1) (1979); see also Jalasko Assos., Inc.
v. Newbery Energy Corp., 663 P.2d 946, 949 (Alaska 1983); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Anchor Cas. Co.,
87N.W.2d 639,644 (Minn. 1958); Hannan Motor Co. v. Darr, 56 So. 2d 64,68 (Miss. 1952). But
see Weston Group, Inc. v. A.B. Hirschfeld Press, Inc., 845 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Colo. 1993) (citing
5A CORBIN, supra note 81, §§ 1230, 1231, for the general principle of the creditor's right to apply
payments in the absence of direction but without requiring notification); Lee v. Yano, 997 P.2d
68, 77 (Haw. Ct. App. 2000) (no notification duty imposed under Hawaii precedent)
(distinguishing 5A CORBIN, supra note 81, § 1231); Mich. Elec. Supply Co. v. Vandenburg Elec.
Co., 72 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Mich. 1915) (holding the creditor's application by an entry on the
creditor's books of account, to unsecured rather than to a secured debt, without regard to the order
of their creation, and without notice to the debtor was effective against the debtor's surety).
112. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACrS § 387(b) (1932); see also Preston County
Coke Co. v. Preston County Light & Power Co., 119 S.E.2d 420 (W. Va. 1961). In the case of an
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is under a duty to apply the tendered money in a particular way," 3 the
obligee may apply the payment to any debt in any proportion, to an
unsecured rather than a secured debt," 4 even to one barred by the Statute
of Limitations or unenforceable because ofthe Statute ofFrauds. However,
the obligee may not apply the payment to a debt if such an application
would result in a forfeiture of another obligation, if the debt is disputed, or
if the debt is unenforceable on grounds of public policy."'
Furthermore, the obligee's application of the payment to an obligation
that is barred by the statute of limitation does not operate, without
additional facts or circumstances, as a promise by the obligor to pay the
otherwise barred debt. "6 The obligor's failure to give directions permits the
open running account, payments by the debtor with no direction as to their application and applied
by the creditor in reduction of the general account prevented the statute of limitations from barring
any part of the account. Id. at 423.
Also, in J. & G. Constr.Co. v. FreeportCoalCo., 129 S.E.2d 834 (W. Va. 1963), debtor sent
checks as "payment on account," at that time owing a "judgment debt" and owing on an open
account. The court held that the creditor was justified in applying payment on the open account
instead of on the one better secured. Id. at 846.
In Atlantic & GulfProp., Inc. v. Palmer, 109 So. 2d 768 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), the court
upheld a mortgagee's application of the insurance proceeds to unmatured installments due at the
end of the mortgage term rather than to earlier installments because the mortgagor had not
objected. Id. at 771.
In Gen. Elec. Co. v. Anchor Cas. Co., 87 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1958), a supplier sued on a
contractor's performance bond for the price of materials used by the contractor. Id. at 641. The
plaintiff supplied such materials to the contractor for other jobs not included within the
defendant's bond, maintaining only a general running account. Id. Certain payments were made
by the contractor between June 19 and December 16, 1953, without direction as to specific
application; these payments were credited on the general account. Id. On January 19, 1954, before
any controversy had arisen, the plaintiff notified the contractor, making specific application of
payments on special accounts not covered by defendant's bond. Id. at 641-42. The court held that
this notice of application was within a "reasonable time" and effective as against the defendant
surety. Id. at 646. The plaintiff's act of crediting payments on the general running account of the
debtor "cannot be considered an application of such payment to any specific item;" it did not
prevent a specific application later. Id. at 644.
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 258(2) & 259 cmt. c (1979). In Koehring
Co. v. UnitedStates, 303 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1962), Hoover sued Koehring (under the Miller Act)
for the use of equipment by the latter's subcontractor, Central. Id. at 469. Central also owed
Hoover for use of equipment on other contracts. Id. In order to pay Hoover, Central obtained from
Proctor (corporate predecessor of defendant Koehring, and prime contractor) a check for $3000
on the subcontract, payable to Central and Hoover jointly. Id. This was applied by Hoover in
payment of a debt due by Central for equipment used on jobs other than Proctor's, without
knowledge or reason to know that it was Central's duty to Proctor to apply this money in payment
for equipment on the Proctor contract. Id. The court held that the creditor Hoover was justified in
its application of the payment and could still recover from defendant for equipment used on the
Proctor contract. Id.
114. See, e.g., People v. Vandenburg Elec. Co., 72 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Mich. 1955).
115. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 259 (1979).
116. Id. § 259 illus. 1.
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obligee to infer that the obligor is waiving the statutory defenses to the
lawful obligation117 and provides a "self help" means of minimizing the
unjust enrichment of the obligor. The UNIDROIT Principles likewise
permit the obligee to exercise discretion in applying the payment received
as long as the obligation is due and undisputed.118
If neither party exercises the prerogative of designating the payment to
be discharged, both the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the
UNIDROIT Principles provide rules of application or imputation to be
followed with some distinctions.'19 If both parties fail to exercise the power
of application as between two or more matured debts, the Restatement
states a priority rule that authorizes application consistent with the obligee's
right to apply payments to implement its best interest but with regard, first,
for the interests of third persons, then the obligee's or creditor's interest,
and finally, the obligor's. Thus, if the obligor owes a duty to a third person
to pay a particular debt owed to the obligee, such as the duty owed to a
secondary obligor or surety on an indebtedness, 20 the court must direct that
the payment be applied to this obligation in preference to a debt that is
unsecured or one for which interest has accrued and is overdue. 2 1 In
contrast, the UNIDROIT Principles rank the obligor's interest in the
matured obligations or the first to mature as first priority; second, those
obligations for which obligee has the least security; third, the most
burdensome for the obligor; and finally, the obligation incurred first.12 With
appropriate adaptations, this rule ofpriority is applicable for non-monetary
obligations under the UNIDROIT Principles as well.'

117. See id.cmt. c.
118. UNIDROIT Principles, art. 6.1.12(2).
119. Id. art. 6.1.12.
(3) In the absence of imputation under paragraphs (1) or (2), payment is imputed
to that obligation which satisfies one ofthe following criteria in the order indicated:
(a) an obligation which is due or which is the first to fall due;
(b) the obligation for which the obligee has least security;
(c) the obligation which is the most burdensome for the obligor;
(d) the obligation which has arisen first.
Ifnone of the preceding criteria applies, payment is imputed to all the obligations
proportionally.

Id.
120. Restatement (Third) of the Law of Suretyship and Guaranty § 21 (1996) provides that
a principal obligor with notice of a secondary obligation owes a duty to the secondary obligor to
perform the underlying obligation owed to the obligee. Id.
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 260(2)(a) cmt. b, illus. 1 (1979).
122. UNIDROIT Principles, art. 6.1.12(3).
123. Id. art. 6.1.13.
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The decision in Fowler v. Courtemanche24 illustrates these principles.
The debtor executed a note and chattel mortgage for the purchase price of
logging equipment.'25 The debt was payable in monthly installments of
$5700 due on the 25th of the month.'26 As authorized by the debtor, the
creditor sold a trailer that had been given by the debtor as additional
collateral to secure repayment of the debt and received the proceeds. 2 7 The
debtor did not direct the application of the proceeds received from the
sale.'28 The creditor applied the proceeds to an open account allegedly
owed to a related corporate entity.'2 9 Thereafter, the creditor declared the
debtor in default, seized, and sold other property subject to the mortgage. 30
This seizure was held to be tortious because a proper application of the
proceeds would have avoided the default on the obligation.' Even though
the money received from the sale was more than the balance that was due
and delinquent, the proceeds should have been applied in payment of that
balance and not to a debt for which debtor had no personal duty. The
excess proceeds should have been held for part payment of the next
maturing installment.132 The default and an unjust forfeiture would have
been avoided.'33
Without debtor-directed allocation and inappropriate creditor
application, the task of determining the appropriate application ofproceeds
fell to the court in Fowler.With its stated goal of accomplishing the ends
ofjustice,'34 the court considered three principles: 1) the identical property
rule,' 35 which requires that proceeds derived from mortgaged property must
be applied to the mortgage debt,'36 2) proceeds from mortgaged property
must be used to pay the debt currently due,'3 7 and 3) the court's duty to
consider the equities existing both at the time the payments were made and
those subsequently occurring. 38

124. 274 P.2d 258 (Or. 1954).
125. Id. at 261-62.
126. Id. at262.
127. Id. at 262-63.
128. Id. at264.
129. Id. at 263.
130. See id. at 262.
131. Id. at264-71.
132. See id. at 275.
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 259 cmt. c (1979) (discussing the limitations
on a creditor's power of application).
134. Fowler, 274 P.2d at 271.
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 258 cmt. c (1979).
136. Fowler, 274 P.2d at 274.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 272-73.
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D. Tender of Performance
Where the agreement between the parties calls for performances to be
exchanged concurrently, each party is entitled to refuse to proceed until it
is assured that the other will perform at the same time.'39 Each party is
entitled to the occurrence of the condition that must precede its
performance-the performance of the other. 4 ° When each party's
performance is a concurrent condition for the other's performance, a party
may tender its performance and satisfy the occurrence of the condition of
the other party's duty, without the risks that full performance carries. 4 ' If
the other party does not tender its performance, a breach occurs.'42 If the
failure to perform or to offer to perform is a material failure, the tendering
party's obligation of performance is discharged.'43 Furthermore, a failure
by both parties to tender during the time for performance results in a
discharge of the duties of both parties, without a right to recover damages
from the other. In this situation, neither party's failure is a breach of the
agreement. 144

139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 238 cmt. a (1979); see also Bavarian Pastry
Shop, Inc. v. Bavarian Bakeries, Inc.,No. 05-94-01002-CV, 1995 WL 702571, *3 (Tex. App. Nov.
22, 1995).
140. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 238 cmt. a (1979).
141. See, e.g., S. Nat'l Bank v. Crateo, 458 F.2d 688, 695 (5th Cir. 1972); Stoner v.
Humphrey, No. CA 93-939, 1994 WL 505232, *3 (Ark. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1994); BavarianPastry
Shop, No. 05-94-01002-CV 1995 WL 702571, at *3.
142. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 242 cmt. a (1979).
143. Id.
144. Aviation Dev. Co. v. C & S Acquisition Corp., No. 97 Civ. 9302 AlP, 1999 WL 46630
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1999). In Aviation Development, the buyer and the seller executed a letter of
intent for the purchase and sale of four passenger aircraft. Id. at * 1. The seller agreed to provide
optional financing if the buyer was unable to obtain financing. Id. at *2. In exercising its right to
optional financing, the buyer made a request for seller financing, placed the required $1.6 million
in the account of its broker, and notified the seller. Id. at *4. When the seller failed to ground the
planes for the buyer's inspection, the buyer sued. Id. at *6. Applying New York law to the
transaction, the court found the agreement ambiguous, applied Article 2 of the UCC, and held that
the payment of the deposit and the obligation to provide optional financing were concurrent
conditions. Id.at * 12. The court further held that neither party performed its concurrent obligation
and neither was entitled to damages. Id. at * 12. In Pittman v. Canham, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 340 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992), a purchaser brought an action for breach of a contract to sell a fifty-six-acre tract
of land. Id. at 341. Both the contract and the escrow instructions provided that time was of the
essence. Id. The escrow instruction further provided for a December 24th closing. Id. The seller
delivered her deed in advance of the closing date to the escrow agent but it was returned by the
escrow agent for notarization. Id. The seller did not tender the notarized deed; the purchaser did
not tender his promised deposit, promissory note, or deed of trust. Id. Three months after the
closing date, the seller sold the land to another. Id. In affirming the trial court, the appellate court
held that a failure by both parties to perform concurrent conditions during the time for
performance resulted in a discharge of both parties' duty to perform Id. (citing 3A ARTHUR L.
CoRBiN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 663 (1960)). In distinguishing conditions precedent and

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

What constitutes "tender" ofperformance?
By definition, tender requires the holding out of that which is to be
delivered or performed before the condition is satisfied.145 Authorities
agree, however, that an offer ofperformance accompanied with manifested
present ability to perform or "due tender" is sufficient. 46 Both the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the UCC permit due tender, an
offer coupled with the present ability to perform, to satisfy the requirement
of tender. 147 A sufficient tender includes: 1) an expression ofreadiness and
willingness to perform, 2) a present willingness to do so, and 3) notice to
the other party of such readiness.' 48

concurrent conditions, the court clarified that conditions precedent must be performed before the
duty of the other arises but with concurrent conditions, tender of performance is sufficient. Id. at
342. In Young v. Brookshire Village Props., 655 N.E.2d 1329 (1995), a purchaser sued a vendor
for breach of contract. Id. at 1331. Without evidence that the purchaser tendered or attempted to
tender the purchase money to the vendor within the period specified, the purchaser was barred
from recovery for breach of contract. Id.

145. E. ALLAN

FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS

§ 8.10 (3d ed. 1999) (explaining the meaning of

tender).

146. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 238 cmts. a & b (1979); U.C.C. § 2-503,
cmt. 1 (2001); see generally Stoner v. Humphrey, No. CA 93-93a, 1994 WL 505232 (Ark. Ct.
App. Sept. 14, 1994) (citing Loveless v. Diehl, 364 S.W.2d 317 (1963)) (distinguishing situations
when only one of the parties has a duty of performance such as a case involving "an open account
or promissory note, an actual offer of the money owed is essential to a valid tender;" and when
both parties are under a duty of performance, only an ability to perform and an "indication" of that
ability to the other party is necessary).
147.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONTRACTS

§ 238 cmt. b.; U.C.C. § 2-503, cmt. 1.

148. Bavarian Pastry Shop, Inc. v. Bavarian Bakeries, Inc., No. 05-94-01002-CV 1995 WL
702571, *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 1995); see also S. Nat'l Bank v. Crateo, 458 F.2d 688, 695
(5th Cir. 1972). Applying the Texas rule of mutual conditions precedent to the interim financier's
telephonic and telegraphic messages for the permanent financier who failed to appear earlier that
day at the scheduled closing in Austin, the CrateoCourt upheld the district court's determination
that the interim financier's conduct satisfied its obligation of tender under the terms of the
agreement that imposed concurrent conditions precedent upon the parties. Id.Although the dissent
agreed that the interim financier's messages evidenced its willingness to make the tender and a
demand for performance of the other, the dissent questioned whether sufficient proof was
introduced to establish the financier's abilityto make the actual tender before the end of day to
the permanent financier in California. Id. at 698-00 (Rives, J. dissenting). In Brooks v. Scoville,
17 P.2d 218 (Utah 1932), a stock purchaser alleged an agreement by the seller to repurchase the
stock within one year from the date of purchase, his demand of defendant on several occasions to
repurchase the stock, his readiness and willingness to tender the stock, and the seller's failure to
perform. Id. at 219. The seller filed a general demurrer. Id. The purchaser had failed to assert an
offer or tender of the stock to the seller. Id.The trial court's judgment was based on findings that
the purchaser had communicated his readiness and willingness to tender. Id. In upholding the
judgment, the court concluded that defective allegations of matters of fact regarding an offer to
perform rather than an absence of facts could be cured by the evidence. Id. at 222. The evidence
also supported a conclusion that an actual tender of the stock would have been vain and useless.
Id.
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In Article 2 of the UCC, tender means "due tender," which is "an offer
coupled with a present ability to fulfill all the conditions resting on the
tendering party and must be followed by actual performance if the other
' The law is clear that when
party shows [itself] ready to proceed."149
concurrent conditions are present, a tender by one is conditional on the
reciprocal tender by the other party, and that an offer or proffer of
performance is sufficient to put the other in breach of the concurrent
condition. This principle protects against the loss of the cost of
performance or the cost of tendering full performance and minimizes the
risk offull performance without receiving the promised return performance.
Without such a rule, the performing party, after its performance, has at best
only a right to recover for the breach having parted with its performance or
the cost of tendering its performance.
Unlike the tender of performance in the context of concurrent
conditions, when the performance called for by the agreement is the
payment of money or the delivery of a thing by one of the parties, tender,
absent a contrary statutory rule, 5 ' requires production of the payment or
the thing required for contract performance.'
E. Legal Effect of Tender
Because tender of performance or an offer to perform is not the
equivalent of actual performance, tender standing alone will not operate to
discharge a duty of performance.' 52 If the promised performance does not
require cooperation on the part of the promisee or promisee's
representative, a tender or an offer by the promisor to perform would
ordinarily have no effect on the right to a discharge.'53 The promisor has a
duty to render the performance-not merely to tender it.15 4 If the promisor
desires a discharge, the promisor must perform to completion the promised
performance unless the other party repudiates or otherwise breaches the

149. U.C.C. § 2-503 cmt. 1.Tender also refers "to an offer of goods or documents under a
contract as if in fulfillment of its conditions even though there is a defect when measured against
the contract obligation." Id.; see also UCITA § 601(c)(1) (adopting "due tender" as the standard

for tender of performance).
150. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 9-1501 (Michie 2000) ("An offer in writing to pay a particular
sum of money, or to deliver a written instrument or specific personal property, is, if not accepted,
equivalent to the actual production and tender of the money, instrument or property."); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-27-1 (1996) ("An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver
a written instrument or specific personal property is, if not accepted, equivalent to the actual
production and tender of the money, instrument or property.").
151. See supranote 146.
152. Spooner v. Polk County, 528 P.2d 597, 600 (Or. Ct. App. 1974) (quoting 5A CORBIN,
supranote 81, § 1233).
153. Id. (quoting 5A CORBN, supra note 81, § 1233).
154. Id. (quoting 5A CORBIN, supranote 81, § 1233).
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contract.' Thus, if A contracts to build a building on A's own land or to
set sail in A's own ship for South America, an offer to build or to set sail
would have no effect as a discharge of A's duty of performance.'56 Only a
subsequent repudiation or57other breach by the promisee would discharge
A's duty of performance.1
If, however, the performance promised is one that requires the
cooperation of the promisee or promisee's representative, a tender or an
offer of performance by the promisor at the proper time and place will
make it incumbent on the promisee to render the necessary cooperation.' 58
Whether the promisee has himself promised to cooperate or not, the
promisor's duty of performance is conditional upon receiving the requisite
cooperation.' 59 In such a case, the promisor's duty to perform may be
discharged by the other's failure to cooperate. 60 It is not the promisor's
offer of performance, however, that discharges him; rather, it is the refusal
of the other to provide the necessary cooperation that discharges the
tendering party. 6 ' In the previous example, assume A agreed to build a
house on B's land and A arrived at the location on the appointed day for
commencing the performance with the necessary tools, equipment, and
personnel only to be denied access to the land by B. Here, A tenders the
beginning of performance with the willingness and ability to perform but
does not receive the necessary cooperation. B's failure to cooperate results
in a breach of B's duty to cooperate and a discharge of A's duty to
perform.
In the context of the rendition of services or a sale of goods, upon
tender, the seller's duty of performance is discharged. Under the terms of
a shipment contract, upon yielding possession to the carrier, the making of
a contract for carriage, and the giving of notice to the buyer,'62 the seller
has no remaining obligation of performance unless the goods are defective
or the contract of carriage is unreasonable.' 63 If the quality of the seller's
performance gives rise to a right of rejection by the buyer or an action for
breach of warranty, the seller's performance is not consistent with the terms

155. Id. (quoting 5ACORBIN, supra note 81, § 1233).
156. See id. (discussing 5A CORBIN, supra note 81, § 1233) (holding that an offer to perform
a reasonably disputed duty did not discharge the duty).
157. See generally Acme Inv., Inc. v. Southwest Tracor, Inc., 105 F.3d 412 (8th Cir. 1997)
(holding that seller's repudiation discharged buyer's duty to perform).
158. Multach v. Adams, 418 So. 2d 1254, 1255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (citing 5A CORBIN,
supra note 81, § 1233).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1255-56 (distinguishing the effect of an obligee's failure to cooperate by refusing
to accept the tender between a unilateral obligation to pay a debt and other performances).
161. See id.
162. U.C.C. § 2-504 (2001).
163. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss3/3

28

Jenkins: Discharge of Contract—Performance and Tender: What Are the Operat
2002]

DISCHARGE OFCONTRACT-PERFORMANCEAND

TENDER

of the agreement and a discharge does not result. If, however, the seller has
completely performed consistently with the terms of the agreement, upon
tender, the seller's duty of performance is discharged." When the
agreement of the parties imposes on the seller the obligation to deliver the
goods at a specified destination, the seller's obligation of performance
requires the tender of documents, if required by the agreement, to enable
buyer to take possession and the tender of the goods at the destination.'65
Upon tender of the goods at the destination, absent a breach of warranty by
the seller, the seller's obligation of performance is discharged.'66 In this
case, it is not buyer's refusal to perform that results in a discharge but the
seller's fall performance.167 This full performance, rather than the shifting
of the risk of loss, justifies discharge.'68 For example, suppose a buyer and
a seller contract for the purchase and sale of goods in possession of a bailee
and the goods are to be delivered without being moved. The seller gives
notice to the bailee of buyer's interest in the goods with direction that
bailee acknowledge to the buyer the buyer's right to possession. Upon
notice to the buyer, the seller has not only tendered the goods'6 9 but also
has completely performed.
Conversely, when the seller tenders the goods to the buyer conditioned
on the buyer's payment for the goods, it is the buyer's refusal to perform
that results in a discharge. 7 ' In this case, the seller has not unconditionally
yielded possession to the buyer's control and disposition. Similarly, the
seller's tender to the buyer of a non-negotiable document of title or written
direction to the bailee who has possession of the goods is a conditional
tender not entitling seller to a discharge until the non-negotiable bill of
lading or written instruction is honored by the bailee. 7 ' The buyer's control
and rights in the goods vis-A-vis the seller remains an issue given the nature
of the document used to give direction to the bailee. Full performance does
not occur until the bailee has honored the non-negotiable document of title
or acknowledgment. 72 The bailee has an obligation to comply with any
instructions received from the seller, consignor, until the buyer, consignee,

164. Id. § 2-503 cmts. 1-4, § 2-504.
165. Id. §2-503.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See id. § 2-503(4).
170. See id.
171. See id.; see generally Jason's Foods, Inc. v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 774 F.2d 214
(7th Cir. 1985).
172. See Whately v. Tetrault, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 838, 29 Mass. App. Dec. 112 (1964)
(finding that the seller's notice to the bailee that the goods had been sold coupled with the bailee's
arranging delivery of the goods to the buyer meant that the subsequent loss of the goods was
buyer's responsibility).
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has presented the non-negotiable document of title.'73 The seller's control
suggests that something less than full performance has occurred. 74
An offer to perform or a tender of performance made conditional upon
some return performance by the other party that the other is then under no
duty to render is not an effective and operative tender either as a discharge
or as a condition precedent to the other's obligation of performance."
When a bilateral contract requires the parties to render performances
concurrently, each party's duty being conditional on such concurrent
performance by the other, a tender by either one may properly be made
conditional on the required performance of the other.176
The question of the effect of a tender of performance arises most
frequently in the case of a unilateral money debt or payment of a negotiable
' tender ofpayment does
instrument. Unless otherwise provided by statute, 77
not operate as a discharge of the debt, even though the exact amount due8
is tendered at the very time and place specified in the original contract.Y

173. U.C.C. §§ 7-303, 2-705 (2001).
174. Id. § 2-503(4) (1998) ("[A] refusal by the bailee to honor the document or to obey the
direction defeats the tender.").
175. See Hepburn & Dundas v. Auld, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 321 (1803) (discussing the situation
when an obligor tendered a delivery of documents on condition of first receiving a written release
of the claim against him); Kelley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1993) (citing
5A CORBIN, supra note 81, § 1233).
176. See U.C.C. § 2-507 (2001); see also Kelley, 846 P.2d at 1243 (following 5A CORBIN,
supra note 81, § 1233) (holding that tender by the buyer of the purchase price with a demand for
a title free from boundary defects was a request consistent with the seller's obligation under the
terms of the agreement).
177. Some statutes provide for the extinguishment of the debtor's obligation after an offer
of payment and compliance with the terms of the statute, such as the immediate deposit of the
funds in the name of the creditor with a reputable bank and notice to the creditor or a deposit to
the order of the court. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1500 (West 2002) ("An obligation for the
payment of money is extinguished by a due offer of payment, if the amount is immediately
deposited in the name of the creditor with some bank ... and notice ... to the creditor."); LA.
CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1869 (2001) ("An obligation to deliver a thing or money is extinguished
where without justification an obligee fails to accept the performance tendered by the obligor...
followed by deposit to the order of the court... if declared valid by the court."); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 54-2-4 (1999) ("An obligation for the payment of money is extinguished by a due offer of
payment, if the amount is immediately deposited in the name of the creditor with some bank of
deposit within this state, of good repute, and notice thereof is given to the creditor."); N.Y. Real
Prop. Acts. § 1921(3); see also Walker v. Houston, 12 P.2d 952, 953 (Cal. 1932).
178. See Norwood Lumber Co. v. McKean, 153 F.2d 753, 754 (3d Cir. 1946); Mitchell v.
Roberts, 17 F. 776, 779 (E.D. Ark. 1883); Walker v. Houston, 12 P.2d 952, 953 (Cal. 1932);
Saunders v. Denison, 20 Conn. 521, 525 (Conn. 1850); McFarland v. Christoff, 92 N.E.2d 555,
557 (Ind. Ct. App. 1950); Kellos v. Parker-Sharpe, Inc., 263 S.E.2d 138, 139 (Ga. 1980); Town
v. Trow, 41 Mass. 168, 169 (Mass. 1833); Cowles v. Marble, 37 Mich. 158, 160 (Mich. 1877);
Mahoney v. Lester, 168 P.2d 339, 345 (Mont. 1946); Bank v. Davidson, 70 N.C. 118, 121 (N.C.
1874); Radin v. Harper, 82 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946); Liberty Nat. Bank of
Weatherford v. Semkoff, 84 P.2d 438,440 (Okla. 1938); Guar. Bank v. Thompson, 632 S.W.2d
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Furthermore, the creditor's refusal to accept the money so tendered does
not operate as a discharge of the debt. Such a refusal by the creditor is a
prevention of performance by the debtor; but it does little or no harm to the
debtor. The latter is not being deprived of any return performance to which
he has a right, and under ordinary circumstances the creditor's refusal to
accept the risks of ownership and possession of the money is of no serious
disadvantage to the debtor. When the creditor's refusal to accept these risks
is a serious matter to the debtor and there is a subsequent loss to the debtor
because of these risks, the debtor should be discharged to the extent of the
loss suffered.
The refusal by the creditor of a proper tender of the money due him is
operative to prevent the debtor from being guilty of a breach of duty,
although it is not a discharge of the debtor's duty.179 It is the creditor's fault
that the creditor is deprived of the use of the money. Consequently, the
creditor has no right to interest beyond the due date80 or to other damages.
Interest as damages for breach is not collectible, for the debtor has not
breached.' Any promise of interest that the debtor may have made in the
contract of loan is discharged because the debtor is no longer in a position
to make use ofthe principal tendered for the obligation. Having withdrawn
the money from the business, the debtor is justified in keeping it segregated
and unproductive in order to make payment of the debt.
Because the creditor's own actions caused the failure of payment by the
debtor and thus increased the burden and risk on the surety or secondary
obligor, the creditor cannot require a surety or secondary obligor to pay the
debt.' 82 And it is equally unjust for the creditor to enforce mortgages and

338, 340 (Tex. 1982); James Talcott, Inc. v. Cohen, 275 N.W. 906, 908 (Wis. 1937).
In Flower'sCase, Noy 67 (about 1600), a debtor brought the money in a bag and cast it on a
table before his creditor and in the creditor's possession. It was held that this was payment and
that the debtor could wage his law when sued. This was a discharge even though the creditor at
once made a gift of the money back to the debtor. It would have been otherwise if the money had
been merely tendered.
See also Perkins v. Pub. Serv. Co., 45 A.2d 210 (N.H. 1945) (presenting an interesting theory
similar to Flowers); Hobbs v. Yonkers, 5 N.E. 778, (N.Y. Ct. App. 1886). In Hobbs, a public
official made an unenforceable promise to accept a reduction of the fees allowed by statute. Id.
at 779. The statutory fees were received by him in full, the duty owed to him being thus
discharged. Id. He thereafter paid into the treasury the excess over the agreed amount. Id. This
was an executed and irrevocable gift. Id. at 781.
179. See C.G. Caster Co. v. Regan, 410 N.E.2d 422, 426 (I11.Ct. App. 1980) (quoting 5A
CORBIN, supra note 81, § 1233).
180. U.C.C. Revised § 3-603(b) (2001).
181. See Norwood Lumber Corp. v. McKean, 153 F.2d 753 (3d Cir. 1946); Forwood v.
Magness, 121 A. 855 (Md. Ct. App. 1923); Nat'l Bank of Rochester v. Erion-Haines Realty Co.,
209 N.Y.S. 522 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1925); Owens v. N. State Life Ins. Co., 92 S.E. 168 (N.C. 1917);
see also pre-revised U.C.C. § 3-604 (1989).
182. U.C.C. Revised § 3-603(b) (2001).
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other liens on property of the debtor, when the latter made a proper tender
and remains ready to pay the amount for which the liens were created.' 83
F. Tender of Money for Dischargeof Obligation
Tender of payment may serve as a condition precedent to another's
"' or satisfy the tendering party's obligation of performance resulting
duty 84
duty
in a discharge of the duty to pay.' 85 Tendering money to satisfy one's 86
of performance discharges the duty if several requirements are met. 1
(1) The money must be of the kind required by the contract. 87 Under
the UCC, "[m]oney means a medium of exchange authorized or adopted by
a domestic or foreign government ...and includes a monetary unit of
account established by an intergovernmental organization or by agreement
between two or more nations.' 88 Unless the agreement otherwise requires
or the creditor demands legal tender or refuses to accept any form of
payment other than legal tender, 189 payment or an offer to pay in a manner
consistent with the ordinary course of business, including payment by
check, is a proper tender.' 90 Use of a personal check rather than a bank
obligation such as a cashier's check, teller's check or certified check,
191
conditionally satisfies the tendering party's duty of performance,

183. See Mitchell v. Roberts, 17 F. 776 (E.D. Ark. 1883); Walker v. Houston, 12 P.2d 952
(Cal. 1932); Latta v. Tutton, 54 P. 844 (Cal. 1898); Hill v. Carter, 59 N.W. 413 (Mich. 1894);
Mendell v. Howard, 208 S.W. 497 (Mo. Ct. App. 1918); Frost v. Yonkers Say. Bank, 70 N.Y. 553
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1877) (stating that tender by ajunior mortgagee for the purpose of acquiring the
senior security does not discharge it).
184. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
185. See In re Gen. Plastics Corp., 158 B.R. 258, 285 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
186. See, e.g., Mondello v. Hanover Trust Co., 148 N.E. 136, (Mass. 1925); Barrell v.
Britton, 148 N.E. 134, 252 (Mass. 1925); Waldron v. Murphy, 40 Mich. 668 (Mich. 1879);Noyes
v. Wyckoff, 21 N.E. 158 (N.Y. 1889); Knight v. Abbott, 30 Vt. 577 (Vt. 1858).
187. Simmons v. Swan, I1 F.2d 267 (1 st Cir. 1926) (holding a check insufficient if objected
to); Servel v. Jamieson, 255 F. 892 (9th Cir. 1919).
188. U.C.C. § 1-201(24) (2000). The U.C.C. rejects the view "that money is limited to legal
tender." Id. cmt. 24. "Money [is that] circulating medium.., part of the official currency of [the
authorizing] government." Id.
189. Payment by check through the mail consistent with business custom, properly mailed
in due time although not received prevents summary cancellation of the contract. Vonk v. Dunn,
775 P.2d 1088, 1092 (Ariz. 1989) (citing 5A CORBIN, supra note 81, § 1235). A tender of payment
by a personal check is not a good tender if there are not sufficient funds in the bank on which it
is drawn, if the creditor has objected to payment by check, or if the tender is conditional upon
something to which the debtor is not entitled. Sieverts v. White, 273 P.2d 974, 975 (Utah 1954),
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 249 cmt. a (1979); U.C.C. § 2-511 (2001);
UNIDROIT Principles, art. 6.1.7(1) (1995).
191. U.C.C. § 2-511(3) (2001); UNIDROIT Principles, art. 6.1.7(2) (1995).
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suspending it until the personal check is honored. Upon honor by the
drawee bank, the duty of performance is discharged.'92
If, however, a bank obligation, a cashier's check, teller's check, or
certified check, is tendered and taken, the tendering party's duty of
performance is discharged.'93 Discharge of the tendering party on the duty
of performance, the underlying obligation, to the extent that payment has
been made, does not affect the liability the tendering party may have
because of its indorsement of the bank obligation. 194 Liability may only be
based on either the indorser's engagement on the instrument or for breach
of transfer warranties.'95
A contract obligation to pay "money" requires payment in an authorized
or adopted medium of exchange by a domestic or foreign government and,
thereby, constitutes "legal tender."' 96 In a cross borders transaction, if the
agreement does not express the monetary obligation in a particular
currency, "payment must be made in the currency of the place where
payment is to be made."' 97 Where the terms of the agreement express a
specific currency, the UNIDROIT Principles authorize payment in the
currency of the place for payment unless the agreement expressly limits
payment to the specified currency or the currency of the place of payment
is "freely convertible."' 98

192. U.C.C. Revised §§ 2-511(3), 3-310(b)(1) (2001); see also Gaunt v. Ala. Bound Oil &
Gas Co., 281 F. 653 (8th Cir. 1922); Sudduth v. Storm King Coal Co., 268 F. 433 (6th Cir. 1920);
Servel v. Jamieson, 255 F. 892 (9th Cir. 1919); Stevens v. Hines, 218 P. 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1923);
Hohener v. Gauss, 34 Cal. Rptr. 656 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (holding tender by check by an optionee
was sufficient, even though in excess of bank balance, if drawee bank had agreed to honor an
overdraft and the optionor had not objected to the form of payment); Kitchell v. Schneider, 103
N.E. 647 (Ind. 1913); Schmith v. Union Mut. Cas. Co., 247 N.W. 655 (Iowa 1933); Steckel v.
Selix, 197 N.W. 918 (Iowa 1924); Neal v. Finley, 124 S.W. 348 (Ky. 1910); O'Toole &Nedeau
Co. v. Boelkins, 235 N.W. 820 (Mich. 1931); Murphy v. Frank P. Miller Corp., 200 N.W. 974
(Mich. 1924); New York Util. Co. v. Williamsburg Steam Laundry Co., 175 N.Y.S. 60 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1919); Ugland v. Farmers' & Merch. State Bank, 137 N.W. 572 (N.D. 1912); Schaeffer v.
Coldren, 85 A. 98 (Pa. 1912); Pershing v. Feinberg, 52 A. 22 (Pa. 1902); Bickel v. Sheppard, 127
S.E. 41 (W. Va. 1925) (objecting to a tender on the sole ground that it is not sufficient in amount
is a waiver of objections as to the form in which it is made, such as one made by a check and
conditional on a receipt); Thompson v. Crains, 128 N.E. 508 (IIl. 1920); Gardner v. Spurlock, 339
P.2d 65 (Kan. 1959) (tender by cashier's check, not objected to); Perkins v. Pub. Serv. Co., 45
A.2d 210 (N.H. 1946).
193. U.C.C. Revised § 3-310(a) (2001).
194. Id.
195. Id. §§ 3-310(a), 3-416.
196. Id. § 1-201(24); see also Margulus v. Mathes, 90 N.E.2d 254, 256 (II1. Ct. App. 1950)
(finding that seller was within its right to object to the tender of certified checks when the
agreement stipulated cash even though seller had other motives for wanting to cancel the contract).
197. UNIDROIT Principles, art. 6.1.10 (1994).
198. Id., art. 6.1.9
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Despite the inclusion of an express currency for payment of the
monetary obligation in a cross border transaction, if it is impossible for
payment to be made in the agreed currency, the obligee may require
payment in the currency of the place of payment199 or the obligor may
provide payment by a means or in a manner that is commercially a
substantial equivalent to that agreed upon.2"0 The sufficiency of the
"money" tendered should be determined by the terms of the agreement and
the relevant business custom.
(2) The money must be produced under such circumstances that the
tendering party's control over the money is relinquished so that the creditor
can take possession of it without unreasonable exertion,20 ' unless by words
(1) Ifa monetary obligation is expressed in a currency other than that of the place
for payment, it may be paid by the obligor in the currency of the place of payment
unless
(a) the currency is not freely convertible; or
(b) the parties have agreed that payment should be made only in the currency in
which the monetary obligation is expressed.
(2) If it is impossible for the obligor to make payment in the currency in which
the monetary obligation is expressed, the obligee may require payment in the
currency of the place for payment, even in the case referred to in paragraph
(1)(b).
(3) Payment in the currency of the place for payment is to be made according to
the applicable rate of exchange prevailing there when payment is due.
(4) However, if the obligor has not paid at the time when payment is due, the
obligee may require payment according to the applicable rate of exchange
prevailing either when payment is due or at the time of actual payment.
Id.
199. Id., art. 6.1.9(2) (1994).
200. See. e.g., U.C.C. § 2-614 (2001)
(2) If the agreed means or manner of payment fails because of domestic or
foreign governmental regulation, the seller may withhold or stop delivery unless
the buyer provides a means or manner of payment which is commercially a
substantial equivalent. If delivery has already been taken, payment by the means
or in the manner provided by the regulation discharges the buyer's obligation
unless the regulation is discriminatory, oppressive, or predatory.
Id.
201. See Kerr v. U.S., 108 F.2d 585, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (finding tender effective upon
actual receipt of letter containing premium by the addressee); Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v.
Underwriting Members of Lloyds, 836 F. Supp. 398,409-10 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that tender
required actual payment in settlement or payment into court by primary insurer of its policy limits
to trigger the obligation of the excess carrier to defend the insured or entitle primary insurer to
indemnification of litigation costs); Arguelles v. Kaplan, 736 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987) (declaring that delivery of deed to title company with instructions to surrender to obligee
after original note was marked paid in full was not a relinquishing of control unless consistent
with the parties' agreement).
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or other conduct the creditor makes it evident that the money will not be
received even if it is produced. 2 In the latter event, the money need not be
physically produced; but the debtor must have it available." 3
(3) The money tendered must be either the exact amount due including
interest or a larger amount without requiring the making of change.04
When authorized by statute, a written offer to pay a sum of money or to deliver property, if
rejected, negates the need to produce the money or property but it must be coupled with a present
ability to perform. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 2074 (2001); GUAM CODE ANN § 8201 (2001);
IDAHO CODE § 9-1501 (Michie 2001); IOWA CODE § 538.6 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-11202 (2001) (stating a written offer to pay a particular sum of money if not accepted is equivalent
to the actual production and tender of the money); OR. REv. STAT. § 81.010 (1999); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-27-1 (2001).
202. Greenwood v. Watson, 171 F. 619 (3d Cir. 1909); Odumv. Rutledge& J.R. Co., 10 So.
222, (Ala. 1891); Rudulph v. Wagner, 36 Ala. 698 (Ala. 1860); Kreiss Potassium Phosphate Co.
v. Knight, 124 So. 751 (Fla. 1930); Mondello v. Hanover Trust Co., 148 N.E. 136 (Mass. 1925);
Baird v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 173 N.W. 686 (Neb. 1920); Lewis v. Mott, 36 N.Y. 394 (N.Y.
1867); Murray v. Bryan, 188 N.Y.S. 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1921); Bane v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 88
S.E. 477 (N.C. 1916); Stem v. Maxwell, 44 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. App. 1932); Poffv. Miller, 235
S.W. 570 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921, Judgm't adopted); Shank v. Groff, 32 S.E. 248 (W. Va.
1898).
The actual tender of money may be excused for other reasons. In a sale of land, payment and
conveyance are frequently concurrent conditions; if the vendor is not able to deliver the necessary
deed, the purchaser need not make an actual tender. The purchaser's ability to pay is a condition
of his right of action. Barrett v. McAllister, 33 W. Va. 738 (1890). One party's repudiation or
inability to perform the agreed equivalent will excuse actual tender.
In Brooks v. Scoville, 17 P.2d 218 (Utah 1932), a stock purchaser alleged: an agreement by
the seller to repurchase stock within one year from the date of purchase, his demand of defendant
on several occasions to repurchase the stock, his readiness and willingness to tender the stock, and
the seller's failure to perform. Id. at 219. The seller filed a general demurrer. The purchaser had
failed to assert an offer or tender of the stock to seller. The trial court's judgment was based on
findings that the purchaser had communicated his readiness and willingness to tender. Id. In
upholding thejudgment, the court concluded that defective allegations of matters of fact regarding
an offerto perform rather than an absence of facts could be cured by the evidence. Id. at 222. The
evidence also supported a conclusion that an actual tender of the stock would have been in vain
and useless. Id.
In Record Machine & Tool Co. v. Pageman Holding Corp., 266 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1954), a
purchaser deposited the money in a bank in escrow for delivery on conveyance, but the vendor
refused performance. Id. at 2. No actual tender of the price was necessary in order to get specific
enforcement. Id. at 5.
203. In Hallv. Norwalk F. Ins. Co., 17 A. 356 (Conn. 1889), itwas said that, if the creditor
refuses to accept the money even if it shall be produced, the debtor need not produce it and need
not even have it in his possession. Id. at 360. This is no doubt correct; but it can hardly be said
that there has been a tender by the debtor. The principal operative fact is the creditor's refusal to
permit performance by the debtor.
In Bembridge v. Miller, 385 P.2d 172 (Or. 1963), a statute provided that an offer of payment
might operate as a tender; but the court held that such an offer did not have the effect of
terminating a duty to pay interest if it appeared that the debtor did not have the ability to make
the payment that he purported to "offer." Id. at 179.
204. Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. Comm'r, 814 F.2d 1388, 1393 (9th Cir. 1987); Pac. Mail S.S.
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(4) Tender must be at the time and place required by the contract.20 5 It
must be made to the creditor in person, or to the creditor's authorized
representative. 6 A tender of payment in advance of the due date and the
creditor's refusal to receive it at that time does not affect the debtor's duty
to make payment as agreed.2 7 Debtor must make a new tender on the date
of maturity or be in default. Likewise a tender of money made after the
debtor has already committed a default was not, at common law, a proper
tender, because the amount then due is no longer a liquidated, definite
SUM.f218 After default there is a right to damages as well as a right to the
principal sum. In most cases, however, these damages are the interest value

Co. v. W. Pac. R.R., 251 F. 218, 222 (9th Cir. 1918); Ebersole v. Addington, 46 So. 849, 849
(Ala. 1908); Shafer v. Willis, 56 P. 635, 636 (Cal. 1899); Wiggins v. Sheppard, 90 S.E. 56, 56
(Ga. 1916) (must include interest due); Smith v. Pilcher, 60 S.E. 1000 (Ga. 1908); Cheney v.
Roodhouse, 25 N.E. 1019, 1022 (111. 1890); W. K. Neckwear Co. v. Rabinowitz, 133 So. 450,45051 (La. Ct. App. 193 1) (must include interest); Am. Sur. Co. v. Venner, 67 N.E. 331, 332 (Mass.
1903); Platsis v. Diafokeris, 511 A.2d 535 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (citing 5A CORBIN, supra
note 81, § 1235); Rolfe v. Patrons' Androscoggin Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 A. 879, 880 (Me. 1909)
(too small by nine cents); Audit Servs., Inc. v. Frontier-West, Inc., 827 P.2d 1242 (Mont. 1992)
(holding that tender of part performance did not extinguish obligation when the subcontractor
tendered $1730.45 of $2,476.87, a contractual obligation for fringe benefit contributions,
liquidated damages, and audit fees); Graham v. Linden, 50 N.Y. 547, 550 (1872); New York Util.
Co. v. Williamsburg Steam Laundry Co., 175 N.Y.S. 60 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919); Krauss v. Potts,
156 P. 1162 (Okla. 1916) (declaring that tender of part does not stop interest, at least unless the
amount due is within the exclusive knowledge of the creditor); Barreda v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank,
206 S.W. 726, 727 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918); Matzger v. Page, 113 P. 254, 255 (Wash. 1911)
(disregarding failure to include three days' interest on $40); Dixon v. Clark, 5 C.B. 365 (1847)
(holding that in an action of debt for $26, a plea of tender of $5 as part of the debt on the due date
was demurrable; tender must be of the whole sum due at the time and place and must be kept
good); Blow v. Russell, I C. & P. 365 (1824); Robinson v. Cook, 6 Taunt. 336 (1815).
205. Rottman v. Hevener, 202 P. 334, 335-36 (Cal. 1921); Isbell v. Walton Trust Co., 163
P. 716 (Okla. 1917); Stansbury v. Embrey, 158 S.W. 991, 992-93 (Tenn. 1913) (tender to bank
if debt is payable there).
206. Cheney, 25 N.E. at 1022; Grand Lodge of Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Clark, 127 N.E.
280, 282 (Ind. 1920); Moffat v. Parsons, 5 Taunt. 307 (1914) (holding that tender at proper place
to a clerk in charge was good in spite of contrary directions to the clerk); Cranley v. Hillary, 2 M.
& S. 120 (1813). If no place of payment is fixed by agreement, and the creditor is within the state,
the debtor must seek out the creditor in order to tender payment to him. See Berley & Kyzer v.
Columbia, Newberry & Laurens R.R., 64 S.E. 397, 398 (S.C. 1909); Jones v. Main Island Creek
Coal Co., 99 S.E. 462 (W. Va. 1919).
207. Bowen v. Julius, 40 N.E. 700,700 (Ind. 1894); Doering v. Schneider, 128 N.E. 936,937
(Ind. Ct. App. 1920); Trahant v. Perry, 149 N.E. 149, 150 (Mass. 1925); Barrell v. Britton, 148
N.E. 134, 135 (Mass. 1925); Shipp v. Anderson, 173 S.W. 598,600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); Peryer
v. Pennock, 115 A. 105, 105 (Vt. 1921). A postdated check, sent by mail in advance, may operate
as a valid tender, if supported by former usage and not objected to by the creditor. Stevens v.
Hines, 218 P. 57, 59-60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1923).
208. S. Ry. v. Harris, 80 So. 101 (Ala. 1918). Tender is not possible in case of a wholly
unliquidated claim for a trespass or other wrong. See Johnson v. Williams, 132 So. 170, 171 (Ala.
1931); Ganus & Co. v. Tew, 50 So. 1000, 1001 (Ala. 1909).
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of the use of the money at the agreed rate or at market rates, the amount
of which can easily be calculated. This has led to the passing of statutes
providing that a tender of payment after default shall be fully operative if
the amount tendered is large enough to include the principal of the debt,
accrued interest, and any further amount to which the creditor may
afterwards be found by a court to have been entitled. Refusal of such a
tender may therefore have all the effects that a tender on the due date
would have had. It may be, indeed, that such would now be held to be the
case even in the absence of a statute.2" 9
(5) The tender must be kept good.2 10 If the creditor repents of its refusal
to receive the tendered payment and takes such action that it can no longer
be reasonably regarded as preventing payment by -the debtor, the debtor
must make actual delivery of the money within a reasonable time of the
creditor's demand for it. Tender is "kept good" when the money is kept in
debtor's possession or on deposit at a bank or other place for safekeeping
or by payment into a court.21' If after the creditor's initial refusal and
subsequent demand the debtor falls to make delivery ofthe money, then the
debtor's initial tender is defeated.2" 2 If the creditor brings an action at law

209. See Mitchell v. Roberts, 17 F. 776,779 (E.D. Ark. 1883); Rudulph v. Wagner, 36 Ala.
698, 701 (Ala. 1860); Latta v. Tutton, 54 P. 844 (Cal. 1898); Loughborough v. McNevin, 14 P.
369 (Cal. 1887); Boise Lumber Co. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. of Boise, 214 P. 143, 144 (Idaho 1923);
Palatine Ins. Co. v. O'Brien, 68 A. 484, 486 (Md. 1908); Cass v. Higenbotam, 3 N.E. 189 (N.Y.
1885); Walsh v. Colvin, 101 P. 1085, 1087 (Wash. 1909) ($800 tendered, the amount in dispute
not possibly in excess of $775).
210. See Bissell v. Heyward, 96 U.S. 580 (1877). Interest is not stopped by a tender if the
debtor thereafter fights the claim on the merits. See Sanitary Farm Dairies v. Gammel, 195 F.2d
106 (8th Cir. 1952); Derby v. Bell, 117 So. 8 (Ala. 1928) (stating that interest is not stopped by
a tender, even though creditor continues to refuse to receive it); Saunders v. McDonough, 97 So.
622 (Ala. 1923); Rowell v. Ross, 87 A. 355 (Conn. 1913); Fortson v. Strickland, 99 S.E. 147 (Ga.
App. 1919) (holding that the amount tendered must be continuously available); Clark, 127 N.E.
280; West v. Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 90 N.W. 523 (Iowa 1902); Silver v. Moore, 84A. 1072 (Me.
1912); Nat'l Mach. & Tool Co. v. Standard Shoe Mach. Co., 63 N.E. 900 (Mass. 1902); Norris
v. Ryno, 135 N.W. 463 (Mich. 1912); Browning, King & Co. v. Chamberlain, 104 N.E. 627 (N.Y.
1914); Werner v. Tuch, 27 N.E. 845 (N.Y. 1891); Halpin v. Phenix Ins. Co., 23 N.E. 482 (1890);
Becker v. Boon, 61 N.Y. 317 (1874); Wood v. Rabe, 96 N.Y. 414 (1884); De Bruhl v. Hood, 72
S.E. 83 (N.C. 1911); Anderson v. Griffith, 93 P. 934 (Or. 1908); Manning v. Brandon Corp., 161
S.E. 405 (S.C. 1932); Barron v. Thompson, 97 S.E. 840 (S.C. 1919); Union Mach. & Sup. Co. v.
Thompson, 182 P. 573 (Wash. 1919); Vergonis v. Vaseleou, 178 P. 463 (Wash. 1919); Hart v.
Kanawha Oil Co., 90 S.E. 604 (W. Va. 1916); Shank v. Groff, 32 S.E. 248 (W. Va. 1898); Gyles
v. Hall, 2 P.Wms. 378 (1726).
211. See, e.g., Empire Fluorspar Co. v. Knight, 65 N.E.2d 37 (II. App. Ct. 1946); Chicago
v. Chicago City Ry., 245 IlI. App. 473,482-83 (1927); Rice v. Kahn, 35 N.W. 465 (Wisc. 1887).
212. See Frank v. Pickens, 69 Ala. 369, 370-73 (1881) (finding that tender of payment to
mortgagee of personal property before the suit did not discharge the mortgage when the mortgagor
deposited with the clerk a sum less than the sum tendered and due; adding to the sum after the
presentation of evidence permitted the mortgagee to speculate and defer payment).
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on the account, even though he demands more than the amount tendered,
the tender is not regarded as being "kept good" unless the debtor actually
pays the amount into court for the creditor's use.2" 3 When the suit is in
equity, however, or in any modem court that has equity powers and a
flexible procedure, the actual payment into court may not be required; such
a court can do full justice by making its decree conditional and can thus
give the creditor complete security.214 Unless the debtor complies with the
conditions prescribed, the advantages of a tender will be denied him.
A payment of the money into court, in accordance with a previously
made tender consistent with the contract terms, operates as actual
performance of duty and as a discharge.21 The only judgment to which the
creditor is then entitled is ajudgment that the amount held by the officer of
the court shall be delivered to him. 1 6 No judgment whatsoever will be

213. Woods v. Dixon, 240 P.2d 520, 522 (Or. 1952) (stating that in an action for recovery of
money, tender must be made good by paying money into court). There are some statutory
provisions making it unnecessary to pay the money into court. Walker v. Houston, 12 P.2d 952
(Cal. 1932).
Also, if the tender is properly made on condition that pledged securities be surrendered, and
this condition is not performed by the creditor, payment into court is not required. Johnson v.
Indep. Sch. Dist. of Va., 249 N.W. 177 (Minn. 1933); Cass v. Higenbotam, 3 N.E. 189 (N.Y.
1885).
214. Cheney v. Bilby, 74 F. 52 (8th Cir. 1896); Regan v. Berent, 64 N.E.2d 483 (II. 1946);
Thompson v. Crains, 128 N.E. 508 (I11. 1920); Kelly, Shuttleworth & McManus v. Cent. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 248 N.W. 9 (Iowa 1933); Perkins v. Pub. Serv. Co., 45 A.2d 210 (N.H. 1946);
Murray v. O'Brien, 105 P. 840 (Wash. 1909); Mankel v. Belscamper, 54 N.W. 500 (Wisc. 1893).
215. In re Gen. Plastics Corp., 158 B.R. 258, 285 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (citing 5ACORBIN, supra
note 81, § 1235 (1964)) (holding that a factor discharged itself of liability for its possession of
receivables due the assignor by filing an interpleader action); see also supra note 202.
216. Money paid into court may be ordered repaid to the debtor if the creditor has become
unable to return securities to which the debtor is entitled. See Levin v. Goodman, 153 A. 476 (N.J.
1931). For the effect of payment into the court, see Brofer Coal& Mining Co. v. Kearns, 4 F.2d
353 (7th Cir. 1925). Four months before his bankruptcy, the debtor unconditionally tendered an
amount admitted to be due on a claim for unliquidated damages in an action in the municipal court
of Chicago. Id.at 354. In that action, ajudgment was rendered for a larger sum than that tendered.
Id. Petitioner sought to recover the funds for the benefit of the estate in bankruptcy. Id. The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling that the effect of a tender to the court was
controlled by state law. Id. at 354-55. Under Illinois law, a tender for unliquidated damages
becomes a fund in custodia legis, "custody of the law is the custody of the plaintiff," and operates
as a final and irrevocable transfer to the plaintiff. Id. at 354.
In Phippsv. Watson, 147 So. 234 (Fla. 1933), an executor of a landowner's estate commenced
an action for determination of which party litigant bore the loss of funds represented by a cashier's
check paid into the registry of the court when the bank became insolvent during the pendency of
the action. Id. at 235. The Florida Supreme Court held that an unconditional tender into the
registry of the court becomes a fund in custodia legis subject to the order of the court or the
pleasure of the depositee. Id. The entire amount paid belongs to the depositee even though a
verdict for a lesser sum is awarded. Even assuming the depositor retained some control or
reservation, upon final adjudication, the court treated the cashier's check as cash and adjudicated
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entered against the debtor on which any writ of execution could be issued.
Instead, the debtor will be givenjudgment for its costs against the creditor.
To have this effect, the tender must be a proper one. If it is not, the creditor
will be entitled to recover not only the balance proved but also interest and
costs.
(6) For a tender of money in payment of a debt to be proper, it must be
unconditional. 2 "7 There is an exception to this in the case of a negotiable
instrument. A tender ofpayment is not rendered ineffective by the fact that
the tender is expressly made conditional upon the production and surrender
of the instrument.218 In the case of a bilateral contract, the duty to pay may
be conditional upon the concurrent rendition of the agreed exchange, in
its disposition to the decedent. Id. Upon adjudication, the fund became in custodia legis subject
only to the pleasure of the depositee or the order, protection, and control of the court. Id.
In Mann v. Sprout, 185 N.Y. 109, 77 N.E. 1018, 1019 (N.Y. 1906), in an appeal from the
lower court's order permitting the defendant to amend its answer to add a counterclaim for
damages and granting the release of funds tendered unconditionally to the court for the plaintiff,
the Court of Appeals reviewed the effect of tender iwcustodia legis under the applicable state
statute. 1d. When a debt is due, a tender of the entire amount without conditions and payment into
the court pursuant to its order is an absolute transfer even if not accepted by the plaintiff. Id. Only
in an independent action for relief from mutual mistake or unilateral mistake resulting from fraud.
Id. Acceptance by the court has the same effect as acceptance by the plaintiff. Other statutes
"expressly discharge the ... [depositor] from all further liability to the extent of the money
[deposited]." Id.
217. Queensboro Nat'l Bank v. Kelly, 48 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1931); Segno v. Segno, 167 P.
285 (Cal. 1917); Edwards-Warren Tire Co. v. Coble, 115 S.E.2d 852 (Ga. Ct. App. 1960)
(rejecting tender because it was conditioned on a release in full of all claims); Sansone v. Crocker,
170 N.W. 796 (Iowa 1919); Leonard v. Woodruff, 243 N.W. 252 (Mich. 1932); Saussenthaler v.
Fed. Union Sur. Co., 193 S.W. 286 (Mo. Ct. App. 1917); Levin v. Goodman, 153 A. 476 (N.J. Ct.
App. 1931); Margolis v. Wittman, 169 N.Y.S. 573 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1918); Albermarle Fertilizer
Co. v. Brock, 121 S.E. 353 (N.C. 1924); Stephens v. Reik, 247 S.W. 627 (Tex. App. 1923);
Rutherford v. McGee, 241 S.W. 629 (Tex. App. 1922); Ken. Va. Stone Co. v. Fortner, 165 S.E.
401 (Va. 1932).
In Swanson v. Baldwin, 93 N.W.2d 740 (Iowa 1958), the defendant made a tender in court of
a balance due from him "to be held until disposition of this suit." Id. at 742. This was a
"conditional" tender that did not make the money available to the creditor. Id. Therefore, it did
not stop the running of interest, even though the amount stated in the tender was as much as was
later found to be due at that time. See id.
In Walla Walla PortDist.v. Palmberg,280 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1960), the employing defendant
tendered to its contractor the final installment admittedly due under the contract, at the same time
presenting with it a voucher to be signed, containing the words "Final payment on construction
work at Attalia." Id. at 239. The contractor refused to sign because he had a claim for extra work
not covered by the contract and he justly feared that acceptance of the payment on those terms
might be held to operate as an accord and satisfaction of his claim. Id. The court held that the
tender so made was not operative to stop the running of interest on the amount due. Id. at 249.
218. U.C.C. Revised § 3-501(b)(2) (2001); Storey v. Krewson, 55 Ind. 397 (Ind. 1876);
Heywood v. Hartshorn, 55 N.H. 476 (N.H. 1875); Bailey v. County of Buchanan, 22 N.E. 155
(N.Y. 1889); Hansard v. Robinson, 7 B. & C. 90 (1827). ContraHolton v. Brown, 18 Vt. 224 (Vt.
1846).
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which case the defendant can be put in default by a tender that is
conditional upon such concurrent performance,"' or upon the concurrent
surrender of securities held by the creditor, in which case the tender is not
ineffective by being made conditional on such surrender;220 or the tender is
conditional upon the performance of conditions precedent to the tendering
" '
party's obligation of performance under the terms of the contract.22
Authorities are split on whether a tender is impaired by the
contemporaneous demand for a receipt in the absence of a statute
authorizing such a demand.222 Of course, the tender is not good if it is
conditional on a receipt in full or upon an acknowledgment of full
satisfaction,223 and the same has been held if tender is conditional upon the
execution of a release ofmortgage security 224 or obligations imposed upon
the tendering by a third party representing the tendering party's interests.2Z

219. See Brinton v. Haight, 870 P.2d 677 (Idaho 1994) (recognizing that tender of payment
conditioned upon contemporaneous release of the security for the debt is an effective tender of a
concurrent obligation). To stop the running of interest, an effective tender must be made and kept
good. Id.at 684. A tender is kept good by manifesting the ability and readiness to pay if the tender
is later accepted. Id. Such manifestation is satisfied by keeping the tendered money on deposit in
a bank, paying it into court or by making the tender in writing. Id. The debtor's tender of a
cashier's check with a demand for immediate delivery of the deed of reconveyance and a refusal
to pay trustee's reconveyance fee was held an effective tender under an Idaho statute that imposed
an obligation on a trustee to reconvey the estate of real property upon satisfaction of the secured
debt. Id. at 683. The statute did not require tender of expenses or fees as a condition. Id.; see also
Storey, 55 Ind. at 397.
220. Berry v. Bank of Bakersfield, 170 P. 415 (Cal. 1918); Wadleigh v. Phelps, 87 P. 93
(Cal. 1906); Loughborough v. McNevin, 14 P. 369 (Cal. 1887); Halpin v. Phenix Ins. Co., 23 N.E.
482 (N.Y. 1890) (finding tender conditioned on satisfaction of mortgage security effective); Cass
v. Higenbotam, 3 N.E. 189 (N.Y. 1885). In Winthrop Say. Bank v. Jackson, 67 Me. 570 (1878),
a bond deposited as security had been stolen by bank robbers, the court held that a tender of the
amount of the note conditional on return of the bond was not a defense. Id.
221. Jacoby v. Rosebrock, 70 N.E.2d 766, 796 (1947); Decorah State Bank v. Zidlicky, 426
N.W.2d 388, 391 (1988).
222. See Sanford v. Bulkley, 30 Conn. 344 (1862) (holding that conditional-tender expressed
to be in full though less than sum demanded by respondent); Storey, 55 Ind. at 397. ContraWalsh
v. Walsh, 108 P.2d 765 (Cal. 1940) (holding that the tender of a sufficient sum entitles debtor to
a receipt in full and debtor may as a condition tender demand for a receipt in full); Lovett v. E.
Oil Co., 70 S.E. 707 (W. Va. 1911). For a statute authorizing the demand for a receipt, see U.C.C.
Revised § 3-501(2)(iii) (2001) (stating that upon demand, the person making presentment must
sign a receipt on the instrument for any payment made).
223. Pleasant v. Ariz. Storage & Dist. Co., 267 P. 794 (Ariz. 1928); Sanford v. Bulkley, 30
Conn. 344 (1862).
224. Storey, 55 Ind. 397; see also Masson v. Ind. Ltg. & F. Co., 101 N.E. 753 (1913).
225. See PDQ Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber, 949 P.2d 792 (Utah 1997) (citing 5A CORBIN, supra
note 81, § 1235 (1964)) (declaring that the bank's issuance of a cashier's check to title company
on behalf of buyer subject to conditions to be satisfied by the buyer was neither a timely tender
nor the actual production of the money; under a statute that provides for waiver of tender if the
recipient of tender failed to object, no objection to a tender was necessary upon the tender of a
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A tender by the debtor of the amount due that is subsequently
determined to be correct is not made ineffective by the fact that the amount
tendered is less than the amount claimed as long as the tender is not made
in such manner that acceptance of the money by the creditor prejudices any
claim by the creditor to a larger amount, either as a discharge or as an
admission.226
(7) Failure to comply with the formal requirements of tender will not
defeat the effectiveness ofthe tender if compliance is prevented or waived
by creditor's repudiation ofthe agreement; if tender would be unavailing or
futile given the creditor's conduct; or if the creditor expressed objections
to the tender on other grounds, or failed to object to the absence of one or
more of the formalities of tender, or objects without specifying the
reason.227 This "excuse" of formalities applies equally to the form of the

check that is not payable when presented).
226. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Co. v. Freud, 63 P. 1017 (Cal. 1901) (holding that receipt
acknowledging amount of payment received without referencing the action orjudgment issued by
the court did not compromise or settle or satisfy the judgment issued and did not bar an appeal by
the tendering party); Joseph Magnin Co. v. Schmidt, 89 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 7 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1978) (construing statute that permits debtor to tender a sum less than the amount
demanded and upon refusal to deposit the lesser sum with the court with the reasonable
expectation of proving creditor right to recover only the lesser sum is deemed the prevailing party,
entitled to attorneys fees and costs without liability for interest from the date of tender); Staff
Indus., Inc. v. Hallmark Contracting, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that
tender of a lesser amount than that demanded conditioned on settlement or abandoning an appeal
is insufficient to toll the running of interest or bar recovery of attorneys fees); Tomahawk Vill.
Apartments v. Farren, 571 N.E.2d 1286,1294 (Ind. Ct. App. 199 1) (holding that tender of a check
for $1000 to show good faith intent to pay expenses upon documentation limited to that effect).
But see Bayliss v. Lake Holiday Estates, 1984 WL 276257 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 1984).
Defendant tendered in-kind properties, unimproved lots and accounts, prompting claimant to
object that the values were less than that required. Id. at * 1. Given the difficulty of valuation of
the tendered properties, the modest percentage of the shortage, and the claimant's conduct, the
chancellor held the tender was effective to the extent of the value tendered, interest imposed from
the date of tender on the shortage only. Id.
227. See, e.g., Perkins v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 45 A.2d 210, 216 (N.H. 1945) (declaring,
in an action in equity, that objecting to the amount of tender and not the manner of tender
constituted a waiver of all formalities of tender other than the amount); Wyckoff v. County of
Monmouth, 21 A.2d 791 (N.J. 1941) (dismissing an action for damages for termination of
employment against the county when the county offered without tendering the actual money and
without paying the proposed compensation into the court an amount in excess of that due).
Employees who objected to the amount but did not object to the form of tender were held to have
waived informality of tender. Perkins, 45 A.2d at 172; see alsoNicklas v. Crowell, 238 P.2d 347
(Okla. 1951) (finding in an action to establish a resulting trust, a mother who had the money,
offered to pay $1000 for conveyance of title without displaying the money, but the daughter and
her husband refused to sign deed and thereby waived tender); Bayless v. Strahan, 182 S.W.2d 262
(Tex. Ct. App. 1944); Rawcliffe v. Aguayo, 438 N.Y.S.2d 697 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); Jenkins v.
Equip. Ctr., Inc., 869 P.2d 1000 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding, in an action for conversion, the
obligor's failure to tender amount due for repair of tractor was excused as useless when obligee
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payment that is tendered, the obligation that tender be kept good,22 and the
actual production of the money.229 For such a result to be reached, it must
appear that the debtor would in fact have complied with all requisites but
for the waiver or prevention of the creditor.23 ° The fact that the creditor
claims too much is not itself a waiver or prevention.
The formalities of tender are generally relaxed in an action in equity to
prevent injustice if the tendering party made a conscientious effort to
comply honestly with the contract or if an unsettled account existed
between the parties, and the tendering party expressed a willingness and
ability to pay what may be due upon an accounting.23 ' In a jurisdiction

demanded in its invoice and through its counsel the balance due on the open account in addition
to the amount due for repairs); Sellwood v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 42 N.W.2d 346, 353 (Minn.
1950) (finding that in an action for recovery on an insurance policy, objection to the amount of
tender rather than the medium waived the necessity to tender money rather than a check); Lowry
v. Northwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 542 S.W.2d 546 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Ricke v. Ricke, 405
N.E.2d 351 (II. App. Ct. 1980).
228. See Hirsh v. Ogden Furn. & Carpet Co., 160 P. 283, 286 (Utah 1916); Perkins v. Pub.
Serv. Co., 45 A.2d 210 (N.H. 1945).
229. See Steckel v. Selix, 197 N.W. 918, 921 (Iowa 1924); Henderson v. Foster, 124 S.E.
463, 469 (Va. 1924).
In Mayron's Bake Shops, Inc. v. Arrow Stores, Inc., 176 A.2d 574 (Conn. 1961), a lease
provided for payment of rent on the first of the month, with a 10-day grace period. Id. at 575. The
tenant appeared on August 12 and offered to give his check in payment. Id. The landlord refused
to receive payment on account of the delay. Id. Three days later he served a notice to quit. Id. The
court held that the delay alone did not terminate the lease, and that the landlord had not exercised
his "option" to terminate until after payment had been offered and refused by him. Id. at 577. His
refusal made it unnecessary for the tenant to make actual tender in cash. Id.
230. See, e.g., Chesterton State Bank v. Coffey, 454N.E.2d 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (citing
5A CORBIN, supra note 81, § 1235) (estopping the bank from attacking any defect in the tender
when the bank prevented tender by requiring tender to a specific loan officer contrary to the terms
of the agreement and without objecting to the conditions imposed upon indorsement of the
tendered check).
231. See Arnold v. Leahy Home Bldg. Co., 420 N.E.2d 699, 704 (I11.App. Ct. 1981),
supercededon other groundsby, Chand v. Schlimme, 563 N.E.2d 441 (I11. 1990). In Arnold, the
plaintiffs' submission of its own closing statement with notice that it would govern the closing
rather than builder's statement was held to be an unconditional tender in an action in equity for
specific performance of a contract to convey land and home. Id. at 707. "In an equity action the
technical rules of tender are relaxed to prevent injustice" if the tendering party made a
conscientious effort to comply honestly with the contract. Id. at 704. If unsettled account exists
between the parties, a willingness and ability to pay what may be due upon an accounting is
sufficient. Id.
See also F.H.T., Inc. v. Bailey, 320 N.W.2d 772 (Neb. 1982). In an action in equity seeking
specific performance of a stock buy-out resolution of closely held corporation. Id. at 774. The
estate alleged that the resolution was invalid, had been abandoned, and there was improper tender.
Id. In defense, the purchaser asserted its willingness and ability to perform its obligation "as
established by [the required audit]." Id. at 775. Failure to tender a specific amount did not defeat
a proper tender because the technical rules governing tender in actions at law were not binding
on a court of equity. Id.
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where equity and law are merged, the equitable considerations should have
no affect on an action at law. The nature of the action or the relief sought
should govern the determination of whether the technical rules oftender are
applicable.
III. CONCLUSION

While technology greatly facilitates communication and revolutionizes
the manner of contract formation, the principles of discharge of contract
through performance, nonperformance, or tender have undergone minimal
modification and remain a stabilizing force in a substantive genre
undergoing dynamic change. Perhaps the reason for such stability in this
area of discharge is that the fundamental goal of the contractual relation at
its inception-obtaining the desired performance, the goods or services
sought-the underlying motivation of the parties has and will not change.
Impairing that goal, then,justifies the abrogation of remaining obligations.
Comparison of the primary principles of contract law on discharge,
performance, nonperformance, and tender, reveals little variation in
substance that can be justified, in part, from the symbiotic evolution of
domestic and cross border contract law; and, in part, by the views and
perceptions of one of the chief catalysts in this symbiotic evolutionary
process, Arthur L. Corbin (1874-1967). Corbin's laborious work, despite
impaired visual and auditory ability until his death, molded and sharpened
the insight of today's visionaries and architects of contract law.
The revision of a revisionist is not a task lightly assumed. Maintaining
the integrity of this initial work while modifying its content to reflect the
substantial impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on existing and
evolving law, including relevant international law initiatives that will impact
future domestic authority, and updating language and case authority to
preserve this work's position as the leading resource and authority on
domestic contract law have been the primary goals. This is a modem
restating-ofthe thoughts and perceptions of the man and scholar who, in his
own words "proceeded to prepare a 'one-man revision' of the entire
Restatement [First of the Law of Contracts]."232

232. Joseph M. Perillo, Twelve Letters FromArthurL. Corbinto Robert BraucherAnnotated,
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 755 n.3 (1993).
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